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SECTION 10 OF THE RIVERS AND HARBORS 
ACT AND WESTERN WATER ALLOCATIONS-
ARE THE WESTERN STATES UP A CREEK 
WITHOUT A PERMIT? 
Michael G. Proctor* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The development of the arid and semiarid western United States 
has largely depended upon the manner in which the area's limited 
water resources were used and controlled. 1 Questions relating to the 
use and control of water have thus been matters of great concern to 
the western states.2 In response to this concern, these states have 
developed a unique system of water rights generally responsive to 
the needs of their semiarid land.3 Most have enforced this water 
rights system by enacting comprehensive statutory schemes for the 
allocation and administration of their limited water supplies in 
accordance with state-defined goals. 4 
The federal government historically has deferred to the western 
• Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1. Cal. v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 647·53 (1978) (general discussion of the problems 
faced by westerners and the steps taken to surmount the difficulties). For a general descrip-
tion of water conditions in California and California's answer to them, see E. COOPER, 
AQUEDUCT EMPIRE (1968). 
2. The "western states," for the purposes of this article, are the 17 contiguous western 
states that follow the doctrine of prior appropriation in allocating surface water resources. 
They are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and 
Wyoming. 
See generally Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts over Western Waters-A Decade of At-
tempted "Clarifying Legislation," 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 423 (1966); Trelease, Uneasy Feder-
alism-State Water Laws and National Water Uses, 55 WASH. L. REV. 751 (1980); Note, 
Federal-State Conflicts O'IJeT the Control of Western Waters, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 967 (1960). 
3. See infra text and notes at notes 35-45. 
4. See infra text and notes at notes 46-51; see generally 3 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS 
LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 141-649 (1971) (appendix with summary of all the 
western states water rights systems). 
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states' control of their water resources. 6 In recent years, however, 
the federal government has become less willing to defer to state 
water law.6 The expansion of federal activity in the west has led to 
an increasing federal demand for western water. 7 This increased 
need has resulted in federal claims to water independent of state 
water allocation law.s More recently, concern for the environment9 
and the ever-increasing need for conservation of water resources 
have intensified the federal interest in western water decisions.10 
This interest culminated in 1977, when President Carter initiated a 
review and establishment of a "national water resources manage-
ment policy."ll One of the major objectives of this review was a 
modification of state water law to ensure better protection of the en-
vironment and conservation of water resources.12 However, the 
mere suggestion that federal policies would force a reform of state 
water laws caused such a storm of protest that the idea was subse-
quently dropped.13 Nevertheless, the recognized need for reform and 
5. Cal. v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653-63 (1978). For a detailed discussion of this 
deference see infra text and notes at notes 52-78. 
6. See, e.g., Cal. v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); United States v. N.M., ,138 U.S. 696 
(1978); see generally sources cited supra note 2. See also infra text and notes at notes 82-128. 
7. See, e.g., United States v. N.M., 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (federal needs for water to maintain 
public lands, in this case a national forest); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) 
(water needed on indian reservation for irrigation purposes); see generally Trelease, supra 
note 2 Oarge amounts of water needed for the proposed MX missile system in Utah); Tarlock, 
Western Water Law and Coal Development, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 511 (1979) (potential conflict 
over the water needed for coal development). 
8. See, e.g., Cal. v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) (federal government claimed that 
states had no control over water needed for and developed in federal reclamation projects); 
United States v. N.M., 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (federal claims under the reserved rights doctrine). 
See generally sources cited supra note 2 (for discussions of the legal bases of federal claims to 
control of water). 
For more detailed discussion of federal-state conflict over control see infra text and notes at 
notes 82-128. 
9. See infra text and notes at 129-43. 
10. U[P]ure water is becoming a critical commodity whose abundance is about to set an up-
per limit of economic evolution in a few parts of the nation and inevitably will do so rather 
widely within half a century or less." Piper, Has the U.S. Enough Water? in UNITED STATES 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY WATER SUPPLY PAPER No. 1797 at 22 (1965). See also Comment, 
Arizona's CCYming Dilemma: Water Supply and Population Growth, 2 EcoLOGY L.Q. 357 
(1972); Lilly, Protecting Stream Flows in California, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 697 (1980) (in California, 
water demand may severely tax dependable supplies by the year 2000) (citing GoVERNOR'S 
COMMISSION TO REVIEW CAL. WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT 1 (1978». 
11. Water Resources Policy Study; Issue and Option Papers, 42 Fed. Reg. 36,788 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited Policy Study]. See generally Aiken, The National Water Policy Review and 
Western Water Rights Reform: An Overview, 59 NEB. L. REV. 327 (1980) (discussion of pro-
posals made). See infra text and notes at notes 129-43 for a more detailed discussion of the 
problems cited and proposals made. 
12. Policy Study, supra note 11, at 36,792-95. 
13. Aiken, supra note 11, at 328. 
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the federal need for water may induce the federal government to 
take on a greater role in western water law in the future. 
The federal government seemingly has the potential power to take 
a more active regulatory role in western water law. 14 The most ob-
vious means of exercising this power-comprehensive federal 
legislation regulating the use and control of water-is not likely to 
occur in the near future. 15 A recent case suggests, however, that 
new legislation may not be required for federal control over western 
waters. This decision raises the possibility that an already existing 
statute could serve as the vehicle for an increased federal role in the 
allocation of western waters.16 
In April 1981, the Supreme Court of the United States rendered its 
decision in California v. Sierra ClubY The case involved a suit by 
private parties under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act18 to 
enjoin the construction and operation of certain water allocation 
facilities authorized by the state of California.19 The Rivers and Har-
bors Act is the primary federal statute for the protection of the na-
tion's navigable waters. Section 10 of the Act20 bars any unauthor-
ized obstructions to the navigable capacity of "any of the waters of 
the United States" and makes it unlawful to excavate, or fill, "or in 
any manner to alter or modify" any navigable water without the ap-
proval of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps).21 The 
plaintiffs alleged that California had failed to apply for a Corps' per-
mit for its facilities as required by section 10.22 
14. See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 404-05, 423-27 
(1940) (commerce power gives Congress broad authority over waterways); United States v. 
Garlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 737-38 (1950) (spending power as basis for federal 
power to construct reclamation works); Fed. Power Comm'n v. Or., 349 U.S. 435, 442-43 
(1955) (power of Congress to regulate use and disposition of federal property). See generally 
Morreale, supra note 2; Note, supra note 2; Hanks, Peace West of the 98th Meridian-A Solu-
tion to Federal-State Conflicts Over Western Waters, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 33 (1968). 
This article will not be dealing with the extent of congressional power over western waters 
that may be exercised in the future. Rather it will only examine the extent to which the federal 
government can use an already existing statute, § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 
33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976) to assert a greater degree of control. 
15. See infra text and notes at notes 444-55. 
16. Cal. v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981), rev'g, Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581 (9th 
Cir. 1979), rev'g in part, affg in part, Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 
1975). 
17. 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
18. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976). 
19. Cal. v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 289. See infra text and notes at notes 314-74 for more 
detailed discussion of the factual background of the case. 
20. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976). See infra text and notes at notes 144-313 for more detailed 
discussion of the Act. 
21. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976). For text of statute see infra note 150. 
22. Cal. v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 290. 
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In California v. Sierra Club the Supreme Court did not reach the 
underlying merits of the case before it.23 The Court, instead, held 
that the plaintiffs had no right to bring suit under the Rivers and 
Harbors Act.24 Although this refusal to imply a private right of ac-
tion under the Rivers and Harbors Act was initially viewed as a blow 
to environmentalists,25 the decision in California v. Sierra Club 
seems more important for the question it left unresolved: to what ex-
tent, if at all, will state water allocations and projects authorized by 
western state water law be subject to the requirements of the Rivers 
and Harbors Act? 
This article will analyze the specific issues left unresolved by the 
Supreme Court and examine the extent to which the Rivers and Har-
bors Act can and should be used by the federal government to ex-
pand its role in western water allocations. The first section of the ar-
ticle will begin with a discussion of the history and development of 
western water law and the traditional role of the federal government 
in western waters. A discussion of the growing conflict over control 
of western waters and the possible motivation for an increased 
federal role will follow. The next section will examine the Rivers and 
Harbors Act in detail. This examination will focus on the potential 
applicability of section 10 of the Act to state water allocations. 
Accordingly, the territorial and subject matter jurisdiction of the Act 
and the permit process will be discussed in detail. The next section 
will closely examine California v. Sierra Club and analyze the 
unresolved issues of that case. Finally, the article will conelude with 
an examination of the extent to which the Rivers and Harbors Act 
can, and should, be used in the context of the western water alloca-
tions. 
23.Id. 
24. Id. The decision made by the Court not to imply a private right of action was not unex-
pected. The circuit courts had split on the issue, compare James River and Kanawha Canal 
Parks, Inc. v. Richmond Metropolitan Auth., 359 F. Supp. 611, 638-39 (E.D. Va.), afj'd, 481 
F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973) (allowing private right), with Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. 
Dep't of Transp., 423 F.2d 104, 106 (3d Cir. 1970) (private suit not allowed). The Supreme 
Court had shown a decided trend against implication of private rights of action. See, e.g., 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). See generally Comment, Supreme 
Court Finds No Implied Right of Action Under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Ad, 11 ENVT'L 
L. REP. 10,098 (1981) (early commentary on the ramifications of the decision). 
25. Borbash, Supreme Court Curbs Environmentalist Suits, Boston Globe, Apr. 29,1981, at 
11, col. 1; Wermiel, Supreme Court Eliminates Option Used to Challenge State, Local Water 
Projects, Wall Street Journal, Apr. 29, 1981, at 18, col. 1. In recent years the Rivers and Har-
bors Act had served as a tool for environmental protection at the hands of private parties. See 
infra text and notes at notes 450-51; see generally Barker, Sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899: Potent Toolsfor Environmental Protection, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 107 (1976). 
1982] RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT 115 
II. WESTERN WATER LAW 
The scarcity of water in the arid and semiarid western states26 has 
necessitated the diversion of water from streams and rivers to 
satisfy the demands of mining, agriculture, and residential areas.27 
The development of many portions of the west has required the 
transportation of this surface water over vast distances in order to 
reclaim otherwise unusable arid land.28 As the west developed, it 
became clear that the limited water supplies had to be controlled and 
allocated in accordance with ceptralized goals. 29 This need for con-
trol resulted in the development of western water rights law and the 
enactment of statutes in most of the western states to govern the ad-
ministration and allocation of water.30 In order to understand more 
fully the conflict over the control of western waters and the need for 
reforms in water policy, it is important to examine in greater detail 
the development of western water law and the history of federal in-
volvement. 
A. History and Development of Western State Water Law 
Western water rights law is quite different from the common law 
which still prevails in the more humid eastern states. At common 
law, water rights are based on the riparian theory.3! Under the 
26_ See supra note 2 for list of the western states. Land is considered arid or semiarid if 
potential evapotranspiration (the total wa"ter dissipated from an area by evaporation from 
water and land surfaces and by transpiration from plants) exceeds average precipitation, and 
the total water supply is insufficient for the cultivation of otherwise arable land. This is the 
situation which prevails in much of the west and explains why water must be diverted from 
streams and rivers for irrigation and other purposes. In the eastern United States, the land is 
far more humid. Land is classified as humid if precipitation is ordinarily greater than potential 
evapotranspiration. Note, s'upra note 2, at 967 n.2. 
27. Much of the water used in the western states is diverted from surface streams. In 1970, 
over 370 billion gallons each day were diverted from surface streams for use. The National 
Water Commission estimated in 1973 that withdrawals in the year 2000 could exceed 1200 
billion gallons per day. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 13-16 (R. Clark ed. 1967 & Supp. 
1978) [hereinafter cited as CLARK]. 
28. See infra text and notes at notes 321-32 for a brief discussion of the huge California 
Water Project, an example of the kind of efforts the west has undertaken. 
29. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 1971) which outlines the purpose of 
California's water laws. Basically the purpose of the system is to recognize the competing in-
terests in a limited water supply and to promote the maximum beneficial use of the state's 
water resources consistent with the public interest. [d. 
See infra text and notes at notes 38-51 for a more detailed discussion of the consideration 
behind an appropriation of water. 
30. See infra. text and notes at notes 46-51. 
31. See United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 744-45 (1950). See generally 
1 CLARK, supra note 27, at 34. 
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riparian doctrine, the right to use water is a property right which 
does not depend on the actual use of water.32 Thus, owners of prop-
erty adjacent to bodies of water have the right to the use of this 
water, but only to the extent that they do not substantially diminish 
the quantity of water flowing through the land of property owners 
downstream.33 The early settlers of the west, however, found that 
the riparian doctrine of water rights was not well suited to those arid 
lands.34 As a consequence, these settlers developed a new custom for 
settling water rights; the first settler to arrive and divert water to 
his claim had superior rights to the water against all latecomers. 35 
This custom was adopted by the early western courts36 and eventu-
ally ripened into a formal legal doctrine, the doctrine of prior ap-
propriation.37 
The doctrine of prior appropriation presently forms the basis for 
most of the water rights laws of the western states.38 Under the doc-
trine of prior appropriation, the first person to appropriate or divert 
water from a stream for a beneficial use is entitled to the continued 
use of the amount appropriated for so long as his beneficial use of it 
continues.39 The concept of "beneficial use" is basic to the appropri-
ative right. 40 Beneficial use is defined generally as any use of water 
32. 7 CLARK, supra note 27, at 309·10. 
33. [d. 
34. See Cal. v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653·54 (1978); Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver 
Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 153-57 (1935). The reasons for the general inadequacy of 
the riparian doctrine to the situation faced are twofold. First, the scarcity of water did not 
allow the luxury of nonuse of water and the riparian doctrine does not require use of water. See 
supra text at note 32. Second, the riparian doctrine, insofar as it is based on the notion that the 
right to water is a property right, presupposes private ownership of land. See Note" supra note 
2, at 969. Because much of the land was not legally open for settlement before 1862, many of 
the early settlers, in particular the miners of the Gold Rush of 1848, could not claim riparian 
rights. 
See infra text and notes at notes 55-59 for a general discussion of how this second factor 
made the early federal acquiescence to state water law important. 
35. See generally, 1 CLARK, supra note 27, at 77-82. 
36. See, e.g., Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146 (1855). 
37. See Cal. v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653-63 (1978); Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver 
Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. at 153-57. 
38. The appropriation doctrine is recognized by all of the western states. 1 CLARK, supra 
note 27, at 80-81. However, some of the semiarid western states still recognize riparianism in a 
limited way. For example, California still recognizes riparian rights in certain circumstances 
but limits this recognition to reasonable beneficial use. [d. The eight most arid states have 
repudiated the riparian doctrine totally. [d. at 80; see also, 2 HUTCHINS, supra note 4, at 6-14. 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. at 742-50; Cal. Or. Power Co. 
v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. at 153-57. 
40. "[Sjtatutes of nearly all western states contain either positive declarations of the rela-
tionship between appropriative rights and beneficial use of water or incidental references to 
beneficial use in the procedures for appropriating water or both." 1 CLARK, supra, note 27, at 
86. See generally 2 HUTCHINS, supra note 4, at 104. 
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that is reasonable, useful, and beneficial to the appropriator, and is, 
at the same time, consistent with the public's interest in the best uti-
lization of water supplies.41 Traditionally, beneficial use has been 
equated with productive use; the term did not include instream uses 
of water.42 Similarly, the public interest in utilization of water sup-
plies and the public economic interest were generally considered 
synonymous by state water rights administrators and courts.43 To-
day, some states recognize instream, noneconomic uses of water as 
beneficial and, therefore, valid appropriations;44 in a growing 
number of states, "public interest" has been broadened to include 
consideration of noneconomic social values.45 
Originally, no federal, state, or territorial statutes declared what 
steps had to be taken to acquire a right to water. 46 Controversies 
arising over rights to the use of water had to be settled in individual 
lawsuits.47 The development of new water uses and an ever-increas-
41. Tulare Irrig. Dist. v. Lindsey-Strathmore Irrig. Dist., 3 Cal.2d 489, 567, 45 P.2d 972, 
1007 (1935); Finney County Water Use!"s' Ass'n v. Graham Ditch Co., 1 F.2d 650, 652 (D. 
Colo. 1924); see generally 1 CLARK, supra note 27, at 86; 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 4, at 493-503. 
Several states have attempted to codify a definition of beneficial use. In California, for ex-
ample, the established policy of the state is that ·use of water for domestic purposes is the 
highest use and use for irrigation the next highest. CAL. WATER CODE § 1254 (West 1971). See 
also TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.002(3) (Vernon 1972) (" 'beneficial use' means use of the 
amount of water which is economically necessary for a purpose authorized by this chapter, 
when reasonable intelligence and reasonable diligence are used in applying the water to that 
purpose; . . . "). 
42. Prior to World War II, little thought was given to instream values such as recreation 
and propagation and maintenance of fish and wildlife resources. As a result, there was deple-
tion of streams and significant interference with instream values. Robie, Some Reflections on 
Environmental Considerations in Water Rights Administration, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695, 710-11 
(1972). See also Tarlock, Appropriationjor Instream Flow Maintenance: A Progress Report on 
"New" Public Western Water Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 211, 213 [hereinafter cited as Tar-
lock]; Lilly, supra note 10; Tarlock, Recent Developments in the Recognition oj Instream Uses 
in Western Water Law, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 871 [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments]. 
43. Robie, supra note 42, at 701-02; Aiken, supra note 11, at 327. 
44. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1243, 1243.5 (West 1971 & Supp. 1982); TEX. WATER 
CODE ANN. § 5.002(3) (Vernon 1972). See generally Tarlock, supra note 42. 
45. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.370(1) (1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.190(1) (1979); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 90,03.290 (1974). The public interest review of California's water law ex-
tends to a wide range of factors including water quality, CAL. WATER CODE § 1258 (West 
1971); domestic needs, id. § 1254; the protection offish and wildlife and recreational needs, id. 
§ 1243; and environmental concerns, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 2100 (West 1982). If the appropri-
ation is not in the "public interest," the appropriation will not be allowed. CAL. WATER CODE § 
1255 (West 1971). 
46. 1 CLARK, supra note 27, at 97. Early congressional legislation authorized, confirmed, 
and protected appropriative water rights acquired on the public domain that had vested under 
local law and customs, but this legislation did not prescribe modes for acquiring rights. 1 
CLARK, supra note 27, at 94-95. See infra text and notes at notes 52-64 for discussion of impor-
tance of these early federal statutes to the development of water law in the west. 
47. 1 CLARK, supra note 27, at 93-94. "On a particular stream, many decrees of adjudication 
might be rendered, each of which necessarily bound only the litigants named therein. One's 
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ing demand on existing water supplies, however, made apparent the 
need for formalized appropriation procedures.48 In the late nine-
teenth century, the western states began to respond to this need by 
enacting water administration laws.49 Today, all potential appropria-
tors of surface water must apply to their states for permission to ap-
propriate water.50 Each of the western states' administrative 
systems determines water appropriation on the basis of the doctrine 
of the prior appropriation of water for beneficial use.51 Thus, each 
state has a comprehensive water rights system with certain common 
elements: a theoretical premise-prior appropriation; a standard of 
enforcement-beneficial use; and an appropriation procedure-ap-
plication to the state. 
B. The Federal Role in Western Water Law 
1. The History of Federal Deference to State Water Law 
The role of the federal government in the reclamation and develop-
ment of the arid lands of the west has been long and active, but 
always restrained. For, through this relationship, runs the con-
sistent theme of purposeful and continued deference to state water 
law by Congress. 52 This federal deference can be traced back to early 
claim to a single water right might have to be asserted or defended against different adver-
saries in several unrelated ... lawsuits." 
48. Id. at 99-100. 
49. Id. at 102-07; see also 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 4, at 298-306. 
50. 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 4, at 302. Of the 17 western states, all but 2 require ap-
propriators of surface water to obtain an appropriative permit. The exceptions are Colorado 
and Montana, which have judicial rather than administrative systems for statutory adjudica-
tions of appropriative rights. Id. 
The permit procedures of the states vary widely in their particulars, see generally supra note 
4, but it is instructive to see how they work in general. California's system can serve as an ex-
ample. 
In California, all potential users of water must apply to the State Water Resources Control 
Board (SWRCB) for a permit to appropriate the necessary water. CAL. WATER CODE § 1225 
(West 1971) (the requirements of state water law apply to state water projects, see Note, The 
Delta Water Rights Decision, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 733 (1972), as well as to federal reclamation 
projects. See Cal. v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978». The SWRCB determines first 
whether there is enough unappropriated water to fill the needs of the applicant. CAL. WATER 
CODE § 1375(d) (West 1971). All water flowing in natural channels, except that necessary for 
prior appropriations, is available for appropriation. Id. § 1201. The SWRCB then examines the 
costs and benefits associated with granting the permit against the context of the lltate's needs 
as a whole. Id. § 1257. See supra note 45 for discussion of public interest review. If the 
SWRCB determines that sufficient unappropriated water exists and that the proposed use is 
in the public interest, it will grant a permit. Id. §§ 1375(d), 1380. 
51. See supra note 38. 
52. Cal. v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653-79 (1978) (detailed discussion of this congres-
sional deference). The Supreme Court has generally strongly upheld this congressional 
deference to state water law. See, e.g., Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 
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statutory recognition of state control of water resources. 53 It con-
tinues in numerous statutes directly and indirectly involving the use 
and control of water, expressing Congress' intent not to impinge 
upon the states' general control of their waters. 54 
The earliest federal enactments regarding western water law 
represented congressional authorization for the states to adopt 
nonriparian systems of water rights. 55 Prior to 1862, the settlers of 
the western territories had no legal right to settle on the public lands 
and, thus, had no vested rights to the water except against each 
other.56 Therefore, when the federal lands were formally opened to 
private settlement,57 the water rights previously acquired under the 
law of prior appropriation were theoretically subject to divestment58 
by the riparian rights of the grantees of the federal land. 59 In 1866, 
Congress addressed this potential problem by acknowledging the 
superiority of the water rights previously recognized by state law. 60 
The Desert Land Act of 187761 further established the federal 
U.S. 142 (1935); Kan. v. Colo., 206 U.S. 46 (1907); cf United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. 
Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899) (the Supreme Court carves out two exceptions to state control). 
53. See infra text and notes at notes 55-64. 
54. See infra text and notes at notes 65-78. 
55. Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land & Irrig. Co., 188 U.S. 545 (1903); see generally Note, 
supra note 2, at 971-77. 
56. Prior to 1862, much of the lands in the west were owned by the federal government. The 
western courts in adjudicating water rights and applying the doctrine of prior appropriation 
did so. with the caveat that this federal ownership prevented absolute vesting of such rights. 
See Kidd v. Laird, 15 Cal. 161,181 (1860). Se~ generally Note, supra note 2, at 970-71. See also 
supra note 34. 
57. In 1862, the Homestead Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) opened federal lands to private 
acquisition. 
58. Some later federal cases suggested that this fear was unfounded; that the federal 
government had by inaction acquiesced in the state-recognized rights. See, e.g., Broder v. 
Water Co., 101 U.S. 274, 276 (1879). 
59. See Note, supra note 2, at 970-71. See also text and notes at notes 32-33. See generally 
Walston, Reborn Federalism in Western Water Law: The New Melones Dam Decision, 30 
HASTINGS L.J. 1645, 1653 (1979). 
60. The Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262,14 Stat. 253 (1866) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1976». 
This act for the first time expressly opened the mineral lands of the public domain to explora-
tion and occupation by miners. Because of the fear that this Act might in some way interfere 
with the water rights and systems that had grown up under state and local law, Congress ex-
plicitly recognized and acknowledged the local law and priority of those vested water rights. 
See Cal. v. United States, 438 U.S. at 656; see also United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. 
Co., 174 U.S. 690, 705 (1899) (The Act "was a voluntary recognition of a preexisting right of 
possession constituting a valid claim to its continued use"). 
Four years later, in the Act of July 9, 1870, 16 Stat. 218, Congress reaffirmed that oc-
cupants of federal public land would be bound by state water law, providing that "all patents 
granted, or preemption or homesteads allowed, shall be subject to any vested and accrued 
water rights." 
61. Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (now codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-323 (1976». The primary objec-
tive of this Act was to provide for reclamation of desert land by granting such land to 
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recognition of state control of water by making it clear that the 
reclamation of the desert lands of the west would generally follow 
state water law.62 The Supreme Court interpreted the Desert Land 
Act as giving the western states plenary control over the unap-
propriated nonnavigable waters within their boundaries.63 The 
Court has, however, consistently carved out two important excep-
tions to this state control of waters. First, the Court recognized that 
the states' control over their waters could not operate to deny the 
federal government water for beneficial use on government prop-
erty. Second, and more important, the Court held that the states' 
control of their waters was limited by the federal power to protect 
navigation. 64 In summary, in this early legislation Congress 
recognized the doctrine of prior appropriation and gave the states 
virtually unlimited authority to make laws controlling the use and 
disposition of their waters. 
The establishment of state control of its waters in the nineteenth 
century was followed by a broad expansion of federal activities 
directly and indirectly involving the use and control of western 
waters.66 Many of the statutes authorizing these activities included 
whomever wanted it. The Act provided that the settlers' rights would depend on prior ap-
propriation and that unappropriated, nonnavigable waters not acquired by settlers were free 
for the appropriation and use of the pUblic. 
62. Cal. v. United States, 438 U.S. at 657. See also Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland 
Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 158-62 (1935). 
63. In Cal. Or. PlYWer Co., 295 U.S. at 162, the Supreme Court interpreted the statute as 
having "effected a severance of all waters upon the public domain, not theretofore appropri-
ated, from the land itself" and that these nonnavigable waters hereby severed were "reserved 
for the use of the public under the laws of the states and territories named." [d. at 158, 162 
(emphasis added). 
What we hold is that following the Act of 1877, if not before, all non-navigable waters 
then a part of the public domain became publici juris, subject to plenary control of the 
designated states, . . . . The Desert Land Act does not bind or purport to bind the 
states to any policy. It simply recognizes and gives sanction, ... to the states and 
local doctrine of appropriation. 
[d. at 163-64 (emphasis added). 
64. In Rio Grande, 174 U.S. at 703, the Supreme Court stated: 
First, that in the absence of specific authority from Congress a State cannot by its 
legislation destroy the right of the United States, as the owner of lands bordering on 
a stream, to the continued flow of its waters; so far at least as may be necessary for 
the beneficial uses of the government property. Second, that it is limited by the 
superior power of the General Government to secure the uninterrupted navigability 
of all the navigable streams within the limits of the United States. 
[d. at 703. 
See also Cal. Or. PlYWer Co., 295 U.S. at 159; Cal. v. United States, 438 U.S. at 662. 
65. Note, supra note 2, at 970. 
Primary among these activities were those that stemmed from the Reclamation Act of 1902, 
Ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.) (authorized 
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statements indicating that, by these enactments, the federal govern-
ment was not seeking to displace state control of water; rather, state 
law would continue to govern the appropriation, use, and distribu-
tion of water. 66 The decisions of the Supreme Court over the past 
one hundred years generally reflect this congressional policy that 
authority over intrastate waterways lies with the states.6-'l Up until 
the present time, then, the federal legislature and judiciary both ac-
cepted the notion that, in most situations, state water law controls. 
Federal deference to state authority has not prevented conflicts 
between the two levels of government over western water use. 
Recently, for example, a controversy arose over the meaning of the 
congressional statement of deference contained in the Reclamation 
Act of 1902.68 In 1902, Congress passed the Reclamation Act69 to 
provide federal funding for and development of massive reclamation 
projects in the arid lands of the west. 70 Section 8 of the Act clearly 
provides that state law will control the appropriation and later 
distribution of the water involved in the projects. 71 In California v. 
federal development of facilities to reclaim arid lands); the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, 
16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-793, 796-818, 820-823 (1976) (authority to license private power projects), 
and other acts which provided for construction of power developments. See, e.g., The Boulder 
Canyon Project Act of 1928, 43 U.S.C. §§ 671-67lt (1976). 
66. In United States v. N.M., 438 U.S. 696, 702 n.5 (1978), the Supreme Court cited a 
Senate hearing report containing a list of 37 statutes recognizing "the importance of deferring 
to state law" as support for the Court's assertion that Congress has invariably intended state 
law to govern the federal acquisition of water. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976); 16 U.S.C. § 821 
(1976); 43 U.S.C. § 617L(d) (1976). But see generally Note, Federal Acquisition of Non-
Reserved Water Rights After New Mexico, 31 STAN. L. REV. 885, 907-11 (1979) (this commen-
tator disputes the assertion by the Court that the 37 statutes constitute the broad policy of 
deference that the Court attributes to them). 
67. See, e.g., Cal. v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); United States v. N.M., 438 U.S. 696 
(1978); Kan. v. Colo., 206 U.S. 46, 92 (1907). In Kan. v. Colo., the Court held the federallegisla-
tion could not "override state laws in respect to the general subject of reclamation . . . . 
Each state has full jurisdiction over the lands within its borders, including the beds of streams 
and other waters." 206 U.S. at 92. But see, e.g., United States v. N.M., 438 U.S. at 696 (the doc-
trine of implied reservation of water). 
68. Ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.). 
69. [d. 
70. The Reclamation Act of 1902 and its amendments only establish the foundation of the 
federal reclamation program; the program is implemented by individual projects that are 
authorized by individual acts of Congress. See, e.g., Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 43 
U.S.C. § 617-617t (1976). See generally Walston, supra note 59, at 1664; Note, State Control 
over the Reclamation Waterhole: Reality or Mirage?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 227 (1979). 
71. Section 8 provides: 
That nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in 
any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, ap-
propriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right ac-
quired thereunder and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of 
this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws and nothing herein shall in any 
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United States,72 the Supreme Court examined the extent to which a 
federal reclamation project would be subject to state water law. 73 
The Court held that, under section 8, the federal government had to 
conform to state water law in two important respects. 74 First, the 
federal government must conform with state water laws in ap-
propriating the water necessary for a project. Second, once these ap-
propriated waters are released, their distribution is also controlled 
by state water law. 75 The Court thus held that section 8 allows the 
western states to "impose any condition on the 'control, appropria-
tion, use, or distribution of water' through a Federal reclamation 
project that is not inconsistent with clear congressional directives 
respecting the project."76 Commentators saw this decision as a 
broad statement reaffirming federal deference to state water law. 77 
The conflict underlying California v. United States,78 however, is 
only one of several unresolved issues between the federal govern-
ment and western states over control of water and water policies 
that have emerged despite the history of congressional deference. 
way affect any right of any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner, 
appropriator, or user of water in, to or from any interstate stream or the waters 
thereof: Provided, That the right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of 
this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the 
basis, the measure, and the limit of the right. 
Section 8, 32 Stat. 390 (1902) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 383, 372 (1976». 
72. 438 U.S. 645 (1978). 
73. The project in question was the New Melones dam which was part of the Central Valley 
Project (CVP) and authorized pursuant to the 1902 Act. The SWRCB issued an appropriation 
permit, see supra note 50, which imposed 25 conditions on water use by the project. The Fed-
eral Reclamation Bureau filed for a declaratory judgment that it could appropriate water 
without a permit, or, in the alternative, if it did apply for a permit as a matter of comity, the 
state should not be able to attach conditions to the permit. See generally Note, supra note 70, 
at 234-38. 
74. Cal. v. United States, 438 U.S. at 665-67. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court 
outlined in detail the legislative history of § 8. In doing so they relied heavily on the history of 
federal deference to state water law which preceded the 1902 Act. [d. at 653-63. See supra the 
discussion at text and notes at notes 52-68. 
75. Cal. v. United States, 438 U.S. at 665-67. One of the primary reasons cited by the Court 
for their holding, and one of the main purposes behind § 8, is the practical consideration that 
the states are the best qualified to control the water. The Court found that: "A principal 
motivating factor behind Congress' decision to defer to state law was . . . the legal confusion 
that would arise if federal water law and state water law reigned side by side in the same 
locality." [d. at 668-69. 
See infra text and notes at notes 472-97 for a consideration of this factor as militating 
against application of the Rivers and Harbors Act to state water law. 
76. [d. at 672. See generally Walston, supra note 59, at 1673-80 (the question of what con-
stitutes a clear congressional directive sufficient to override state water law is bound to raise 
new problems); Note, supra note 70, at 238-47. (This commentator also sees difficulties arising 
from application of the California holding). 
77. See generally Walston, supra note 59; Note, supra note 70. 
78. See supra text and note at note 73. 
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2. Federal-State Conflicts Over Use and Control of 
VVestern VVaters 
123 
Despite the long history of congressional deference to the western 
states' control of their water resources, the division of power be-
tween the federal and state governments over water allocations has 
become less clear in more recent years due to increasing conflict over 
the use and control of western waters. At present, the main source 
of this conflict is increasing federal demand for water and a concomi-
tant reluctance on the part of the federal government to submit to 
state water laws to acquire this water.79 Another source of conflict, 
one potentially more important than the first, is the need for reform 
in national water policies and, particularly, in western state water 
laws.80 Recent federal proposals have explicitly recognized the need 
for such reforms and have raised the possibility, and the fears of the 
western states, that the federal government may in the future take 
an active role in instituting these reforms in derogation of state con-
trol. 81 In order to better understand the present state of the federal-
state relationship, and thus the possible motivation for a more active 
federal role in in stream water allocations, it is necessary to examine 
further the sources of conflict over western water. 
The primary source of conflict over the control of western waters 
is federal claims to proprietary rights to water. The claims of federal 
water rights stem from the federal need for water for the vast 
amounts of reserved82 and unreserved public land83 in the western 
states. Early in this century, most federal agencies in need of water 
for use on federal lands applied to the states for water rights.84 More 
recently, however, the federal need for water on these lands has in-
creased, and the federal government has become less willing to sub-
ject itself to state water law for rights to appropriate such waters.85 
79. See infra text and notes at notes 81-128. 
80. See infra text and notes at notes 129-42. 
81. [d.; see also supra text and notes at notes 9-13. 
82. Federal Reserved lands are those lands in the public domain withdrawn from sale or set-
tlement and appropriated to specific public uses; such as parks, national forests, military posts, 
and Indian lands. See United States v. N.M., 438 U.S. 696 (1978). 
83. Federal nonreserved lands are those parts of the federal domain which are not statuto-
rily reserved. 
Theoretically, much of it can still be privately acquired under a series of old land set-
tlement and mining laws, although this is becoming increasingly difficult. The old 
policy of disposition of the public land to encourage settlement and development of 
the west has given way to a new policy of retention and management. 
Trelease, supra note 2, at 757. 
84. See United States v. N.M., 438 U.S. at 702·03. 
85. See, e.g., United States v. N.M., 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
See also Nev. v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600, 601 (D. Nev. 1958), afJ'd on other grounds, 
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The main reason for this reticence seems to be the federal concern 
that many of the purposes for which it wants water86 would either 
not be recognized by state water law to the extent necessary, or 
would lead to inconsistent results from state to state.87 There are 
two theories through which the federal government has sought to 
authorize and protect water rights for federal lands independent of 
state law: the reserved rights doctrine; and the federal nonreserved 
right.88 
Much of the controversy that now exists between the states and 
the federal government over water allocations has been generated 
by the reserved rights doctrine.89 The federal government has used 
this judicially created doctrine90 to authorize and protect federal 
water use in connection with federal reserved lands.91 The doctrine 
holds that Congress, in authorizing the creation of reserved lands, 
impliedly reserved sufficient water resources to accommodate the 
purposes for which the lands were specifically withdrawn.92 Under 
279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960) (military post did not file for state water permit). 
86. For example, federal agencies have become increasingly aware of the desirability of in-
stream flows on federal lands for recreational uses, or scenic and aesthetic purposes and fear 
that such rights will not be recognized by state water laws which are geared generally to more 
utilitarian purposes and designed for diversion and development. See United States v. N.M., 
438 U.S. 696 (1978) (the federal government wanted water for, among other things, wildlife 
maintenance and aesthetics). See generally supra text and notes at notes 42-4fi and infra at 
notes 129-34; Trelease, supra note 2, at 756-57. 
87. See Trelease, supra note 2, at 773 (citing a federal report which argues that, if federal 
agencies must follow state law, the application of federal law will not be uniform throughout 
the states and thus the effect of federal programs will differ from state to state). See also 
Moreale, supra note 2, at 469 (citing a federal official who argued that following state law 
would hamper national defense). 
88. See infra text and notes at notes 118-28. 
89. The reserved rights doctrine is also known as the doctrine of implied reservation of 
water. See generally Elliot, United States v. New Mexico: Purposes That Hold No Water, 22 
ARIZ. L. REV. 19 (1980); Trelease, supra note 2; Morreale, supra note 2. 
90. The underpinnings of the doctrine are found in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & 
Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899) where the Court found that a state's right to appropriate 
water is limited by the federal power to secure water for government property. See supra note 
64. 
In Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), the Supreme Court recognized the re-
served right explicitly in the Indian reservation context, holding that enough wa.ter for irriga-
tion purposes was impliedly reserved, dating back to the date on which the reservation was 
created. Thus, priority of federal interest was secured over the state-created interests. 
In the Polten Dam case, Fed. Power Comm'n v. Or., 349 U.S. 435 (1955), the doctrine was 
held applicable to all federally reserved lands. See also Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 
128, 141 (1976); Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. 564 (1963). 
91. See, e.g., United States v. N.M., 438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978); Colo. River Water Cons. Dist. 
v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 805 (1976); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); 
United States v. Dist. Court in and for Water Div. No.5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971). See generally 
Trelease, supra note 2; Elliot, supra note 89. 
92. United States v. N.M., 438 U.S. at 700. See also Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 188. 
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the doctrine, the federal government has a right to the quantity of 
water impliedly reserved, independent of state law.93 The doctrine 
is, then, an exception to the usual rule of federal deference to state 
control of water. 
The doctrine of reserved rights conflicts with the interests of the 
western states in two ways. First, use of the reserved rights doctrine 
has put the federal government in conflict with the general principle 
favoring a state's control of its own waters. The federal proprietary 
claims are independent of state water law94 and, absent a full quan-
tification of the federal claims under the doctrine, unpredictable as 
well.95 If water were abundant the federal claims would pose no 
problem. In the arid lands of the west, however, the federal claims 
inescapably vie with other public and private claims for the limited 
quantities of water available.96 They thus undermine the western 
states' attempts to define the direction and form of their growth 
through centralized water allocation policies.97 This basic disruption 
is compounded by the sheer quantity of reserved lands in the 
western states.98 Second, the doctrine of reserved rights is (at least 
theoretically99) incompatible with western state water law in four 
ways.lOO First, with a reserved right to water, the federal govern-
ment is not subject to the beneficial use requirement as defined 
under state law. lOl Second, the right to the water is not dissipated by 
nonuse as it would be under the doctrine of prior appropriation. lo2 
93. United States v. N.M., 438 U.S. at 698-700. See Note, Water in the Woods: The Reserved 
Rights Doctrine and National Forest Lands, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1195-98 (1968) (for a 
discussion of typical agency practice and use of doctrine prior to United States v. N.M.). 
94. See supra cases cited at notes 90-91. 
95. Hanks, supra note 14, at 43 ("[w]ater use will vary from relatively predictable, minor 
amounts in national forests to less predictable, substantial amounts on Indian Reservations 
and lands held by the Defense Department. Understandably, the states are concerned that 
they do not know the extent of the federal claim"). 
96. United States v. N.M., 438 U.S. at 699. 
97. See Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (holding that under the reserved rights doctrine 
the Secretary of the Interior had the power to allocate waters of the Colorado River among 
users in Arizona, California, and Nevada). See generally Trelease, supra note 2, at 772-73; 
Hanks, supra note 14, at 43-44. 
98. United States v. N.M., 438 U.S. at 699-700. 
99. Some commentators have suggested that because the non-Indian federal rights involved 
are often relatively small (the amounts of water claimed in United States v. N.M. for example 
were relatively small, see Trelease, supra note 2, at 759), the perceived theoretical incom-
patability between state water law and the reserved rights doctrine is largely overplayed. 
Trelease, Federal Reserved Water Rights Since the PLLRC, 54 DEN. L. J. 473, 491-92 (1977). 
See also Elliot, supra note 89, at 19. 
100. Elliot, supra note 89, at 19-20. 
101. [d. See supra text and notes at notes 90-95; see generally Hanks, supra note 14, at 41. 
102. Elliot, supra note 89, at 20. 
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Third, unlike state law, where the amount of water to be ap-
propriated is based on the amount of water available, quantification 
of the reserved right depends upon the amount necessary to fulfill 
the purposes for which the land was withdrawn. lOS Finally, and most 
important, the reserved right has priority as of the date the reserva-
tion of land is made; not when the water use begins.104 Thus, a holder 
of a state-authorized appropriative right to water, awarded after a 
federal reservation is created, may lose his priority to the water even 
though he is the first actual taker .106 The doctrine of reserved rights, 
therefore, impinges on the state's general authority to regulate 
water use and on particular aspects of state water law. 
The potential impact of the federal reserve right on state control 
and state water law prompted many congressional proposals in the 
late 1950's and early 1960's to neutralize the rights, none of which 
passed.106 However, the most recent Supreme Court decision to ad-
dress the reserved rights doctrine-United States v. New Mex-
ico107 -suggests that the doctrine has limits. The Supreme Court, in 
that case, indicated thatit will take a restrictive approach i.n imply-
ing the purposes for which water can be reserved. 
In United States v. New Mexico, the Supreme Court examined the 
federal claims for reserved rights to water for use in the Gila Na-
tional Forest.108 The federal government claimed that Congress, in 
setting aside the forest,109 impliedly reserved the use of water from 
the Rio Mimbres River for several purposes, including wildlife main-
tenance, aesthetics, stock-grazing, and recreation.110 The Court, 
relying heavily on the history of congressional deference to state 
water law,l11 held that only those quantities of water necessary to 
fulfill the primary purpose of the original reservation eould be 
reserved.112 In determining the primary purposes of the original 
103. [d. See United States v. N.M., 438 U.S. at 700. 
104. Elliot, supra note 89, at 19-20. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 
(1976). 
105. See Trelease, supra note 2, at 756. Conversely, state water rights created prior to the 
reservation still have priority. 
106. See generally Morreale, supra note 2; Hanks, supra note 14. 
107. 438 U.S. 696 (1978). 
108. [d. 
109. The Gila National Forest was set aside pursuant to the Organic Administrative Act of 
1897, 30 Stat. 34 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). See United States v. 
N.M., 438 U.S. at 706-07,718. 
110. United States v. N.M., 438 U.S. at 698. 
111. [d. at 701-02. The decision In this case was rendered on the same day as Cal. v. United 
States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), and it incorporated by reference that decision's extensive discus-
sion of congressional deference. See supra text and notes at notes 52-78. 
112. United States v. N.M., 438 U.S. at 702. 
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reservation, the Court gave the enabling statute a very strict 
reading.113 As a consequence, the Court denied most of the federal 
claims, holding that the statute impliedly reserved water only for the 
more limited purposes of insuring favorable conditions of water flow 
and furnishing a continuous supply of timber.114 The decision by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. New Mexico was viewed by the 
western states as significantly increasing state control of western 
water. 116 
United States v. New Mexico severely cuts back on the use of the 
reserved rights doctrine and, thus, on the possibilities for federal-
state conflict over the use of that doctrine. It seems likely, however, 
that there will be future conflicts over the federal need for water.U6 
The actions of the federal government after the decision indicate 
that the reserved rights doctrine will still be usedu7 and that the 
federal government will seek other theories on which to base its 
claim to water rights independent of state law. This latter point is il-
lustrated by a claim by the Interior Department of a new type of 
federal water right, the so-called federal nonreserved right.us 
The federal "nonreserved water right" would allow the federal 
government to claim water for secondary-as opposed to pri-
mary-purposes on reserved lands and for use on unreserved public 
lands. 119 The basis of the federal claim to a federal nonreserved right 
to water is that the national government has a right "to carry out 
congressional authorized management objectives" on federal 
113. The Court, looking only to the subjective intent of the statute as reflected in its 
legislative history and not at the broad language on the face of the statute, found the implied 
rights to be limited. Id. at 706-711. Commentators have generally been critical of the Court's 
construction of the Acts under which the National Forests were created. See, e.g., Elliot, supra 
note 89; Note, United States v. New Mexico: The Beginning of a Trend Toward Favoring State 
Water Rights Over Federal Water Rights, 9 N.M. L. REV. 361 (1979). 
114. United States v. N.M. 438 U.S. at 716-18. 
115. See In New Mexico, Water is Valuable Resource-And So Is Water Boss, Wall St. J., 
May 1, 1980, at 1, col. 1. See generally Comment, Federal Non-Reserved Water Rights, 48 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 758, 760 (1981). 
116. See generally Trelease, supra note 2, at 760-75. 
117. Shortly after the decision in United States v. N.M., the federal government made 
claims to two new types of reserved rights. First, it asserted that there is a federal reserved 
right to sustain a "groundwater level for general ecosystem maintenance." Trelease, supra 
note 2, at 760-61. Second, the Interior Department made a broad claim of a reserved right 
relating to "public water holes and springs." Department of the Interior Solicitor's Opinion 
No. M-36914, Federal Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, 
Bureau of Reclamation and the Bureau of Land Management, 86 Interior Dec_ 553 (1979) 
[hereinafter cited Solicitor's Opinion]. 
118. Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 117, at 574; see generally Trelease, supra note 2; Com-
ment, supra note 115. 
119. Trelease, supra note 2. 
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lands. 120 In the exercise of the nonreserved right, compliance with 
state law, although desirable, is not required.121 Therefore, under 
this claim to a water right, the federal government can appropriate 
water for its purposes122 without regard to whether the state recog-
nizes that purpose as a beneficial use, or whether the state laws 
would create and protect such a water right.123 This claim to a new 
federal right to water has met with considerable opposition from the 
proponents of state control of water124 and early commentators.125 
At this time, the status of the new claim is not clear; because of the 
opposition, the Secretary of the Interior has decided to postpone pur-
suing claims under this theory.126 Whether this claim to a new type 
of federal water right will be successfully used is, therefore, uncer-
tain.127 It serves to illustrate, however, both the continued reluc-
tance of the federal government to submit to state water law for a 
determination of its water needs and the conflict that has resulted 
between the state and federal governments over the control of 
western waters.128 This conflict over federal needs may ultimately 
120. Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 117, at 574; see also Comment, supra note 115, at 761. 
121. Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 117, at 571, 577; see Comment, supra note 115, at 761. 
122. The Solicitor's major claim to water, indeed the federal need for water often identified 
the one most likely to suffer from state laws, is for instream flows. The Solicitor claims that 
water for instream flows are needed to meet the "management objectives" of the Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976). Solicitor's Opinion, supra 
note 117, at 614-15. See generally Trelease, supra note 2, at 771. Professor Trelease suggests 
that the nonreserved right would be used to justify large federal projects like the MX missile. 
Id. at 770. 
123. In contrast to the reserved right, the federal nonreserved right would bear a priority as 
of the date of actual use or claim. See Trelease, supra note 2, at 757. See supra text and notes 
at notes 104-05. 
124. See Comment, supra note 115, at 761. 
125. See generally Trelease, supra note 2; Simms, National Water Policy in the Wake of 
United States v. New Mexico, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1980); Comment, Federal Non-
Reserved Water Rights, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 67 (1980); Aiken, supra note 11. 
126. Comment, supra note 115, at 761-62. 
127. The theory has not yet been explicitly tested by the courts. But see Colville Con-
federated Tribes v. Walton, 460 F. Supp. 1320, 1333 (E.D. Wash. 1978) ("where water is not 
explicitly or impliedly reserved, it must be appropriated under state water laws even when 
needed by the Federal sovereign for a federal reserve"). 
128. In 1961, a Senate Committee addressed the problems of federal state relations: 
Clarification of the Federal position in connection with water rights. -With demand 
for water far outreaching increases in present sources of supply, conflicts between 
the States and the Federal Government over the control and use of water are grow-
ing sharper and more serious. The problem is a national one, but its threat is especial-
ly grave in the public land States of the semiarid West, where not only is water even 
more scarce than elsewhere in our country but where Federal ownership of millions 
upon millions of acres of land give the Federal Government an asserted basis for 
claiming proprietorship, 'paramount rights,' or title in fee simple absolute to all unap-
propriated waters in many of our States. 
Inevitably, such sweeping claims by the Federal Government might retard State 
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lead the federal government to assert more control over western 
waters. 
The tension between the federal and state governments over con-
trol of western waters is likely to be exacerbated by the need for 
reform in state water law and pressure to create a national water 
policy. State water law has been noted for its failure to provide ade-
quate protection for the environment,129 to promote conservation of 
water resources,130 and to respond to modern problems such as the 
need to manage groundwater resources.13l The basic reason for 
these shortcomings is that the doctrine of prior appropriation for 
beneficial use, on which western water rights law is based, was 
designed to promote the economic development of the west, using 
the available water resources to their fullest extent. 132 As a result, 
western water rights law still reflects the original emphasis on 
plans and projects for development of their own water resources to meet local needs 
and conditions for their own citizens in accordance with their own local law and 
custom. 
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON NAT'L WATER RESOURCES, S. REP. No. 15, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 65 
(1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 COMM. REPORT]. 
129. The National Water Commission pointed out this shortcoming in state water law: 
The water law systems of most of the States . . . are deficient in that they fail to 
give appropriate recognition to social values of water. These values arise primarily 
from such instream uses as fish and wildlife propagation, recreation, and esthetics. 
The appropriation law of the Western States generally requires diversion of water 
from the stream or lake and its application to beneficial use in order for water rights 
to be created. Instream values are thus heavily discounted; water has been diverted 
from streams to such an extent that instream values which should have been pro-
tected frequently have been impaired, and sometimes destroyed. 
U.S. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. WATER POLICY 63 (1973). See also supra 
text and notes at notes 9-13,42-45; see generally Aiken, supra note 11; Tarlock, supra note 42; 
Robie, supra note 42; Lilly, supra note 10; Hanks, supra note 14, at 48-49. 
130. In fact, western water law has been seen to provide disincentives to conserve water. 
The present system of water rights, which provide for diversions first in time to 
have the most secure rights, provides little stimulus toward more efficient use of 
water, and, in fact, may promote inefficient and wasteful use of water in order to 
perfect larger rights. As the demands on the water resources of the West grow it may 
well be an economic necessity for some of the Western States to review their water 
laws with a view to changes which will bring about more efficient use of water, or else 
accept a ceiling on their potential growth. 
1961 COMM. REPORT, supra note 128, at 54. See also Aiken, supra note 11, at 329-34 (this com-
mentator looks at the water use efficiency of irrigation and finds it lacking); Comment, supra 
note 10, at 367 (the law now promotes maximum use of water resources). 
131. See generally Aiken, supra note 11; Comment, supra note 10. Ground water mining is 
a potentially serious problem in the west which the states have not yet heavily regulated. 
Aiken, supra note 11, at 334. See generally Aiken & Supalla, Ground Water Mining and 
Western Water Rights Law: The Nebraska Experience, 24 S. D. L. REV. 607 (1979). 
132. See supra text and notes at notes 41-45. See also Aiken, supra note 11, at 327-28. 
Federal water policies accepted and helped to promote the emphasis on development and use 
of water through programs like the Reclamation Act of 1902. See supra text and notes at notes 
65-71. 
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economic development despite the obviously increasing need to con-
serve water and to account for noneconomic values such as environ-
mental protection.l33 Some of the western states have begun to 
reform their laws to take such matters into account, but, in general, 
western water law has been slow to respond to the needs for 
reform.l34 
Various federal proposalsl36 and studiesl36 have recognized the 
problems with state water law and with national water policy. These 
past federal initiatives inevitably raise questions concerning the 
scope of federal power over water and the possibility that the federal 
government will ultimately take a more active role in the manage-
ment of western waters in derogation of state controJ.137 Most 
recently, in 1977, President Carter initiated a review and establish-
ment of a "national water resources management policy."l38 The 
major objectives of the proposed new policyl39 included modifying 
state water laws to achieve environmental protection and water use 
efficiency objectives.l4o The mere suggestion that federal water 
133. "In most states, water rights administration follows traditional economie concepts of 
cost-benefit analysis, which do not consider values such as scenic beauty and fish and wildlife 
resources to the extent that readily measurable irrigation, and municipal and industrial water 
benefits are considered." Robie, supra note 42, at 705; Lilly, supra note 10, at 693-700. 
134. See supra text and notes at notes 42-45. See generally Tarlock, supra note 42; Aiken, 
supra note 11. 
135. See, e.g., Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the 
Rule of No Compensation, 3 NAT. RESOURCE J. 1 (1963) (cites President Kennedy's Special 
Message on Natural Resources which proposed measures for better water conservation in-
cluding the development of comprehensive river basin plans by 1970); Policy Study, supra 
note 11. 
136. Morreale, supra note 2, at 424-38 (discussing the 1961 COMM. REPORT, supra note 128); 
See also NAT'L WATER COMM'N, NEW DIRECTION IN U.S. WATER POLICY (1973) (a summary of 
conclusions and recommendations of the National Water Commisaion report); see generally 1 
CLARK, supra note 27, at 1-6 (1978 Supp.). 
137. See generally Hanks, supra note 14; Aiken, supra note 11. 
138. Policy Study, supra note 11. See generally Aiken, supra note 11. 
139. Other major objectives of the Policy Study included: 
1.) Giving environmental and water conservation objectives greater emphasis in 
federal water project planning. Policy Study, supra note 11, at 36,788-90. 
2.) Reducing the federal share in financing water resource development projects 
by requiring increased state and private financing. [d. at 36,790-92. 
140. ld. at 36,792-95. 
Specifically, state water laws were characterized as generally: 
1.) not reflecting or accommodating environmental values; 
2.) not addressing interrelationships between surface water and grand water; 
3.) not facilitating the conjunctive (i.e., integrated) use of surface water and 
ground water; 
4.) not requiring or encouraging a high degree of water use efficiency; and 
5.) being too inflexible to permit effective water management. 
Aiken, supra note 11, at 328 (citing Policy Study, supra note 11, at 36,792-95). 
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policies would force substantive reforms in state water rights law, 
however, raised such a storm of protest in the western states that 
the idea was subsequently dropped as an explicit objective in the na-
tional water policy review.141 A clear need still exists, however, for 
reform in state and national water policies to bring about better pro-
tection of the environment and conservation of water resources. 142 It 
is difficult to predict whether the impetus for these reforms ultimate-
ly will come from the states143 or the federal government, but the 
potential for conflict over the need for reform remains, as does the 
possibility that the federal government will take a more active role in 
water allocations to bring these reforms about. 
In summary, while Congress has historically deferred to state con-
trol and allocation of water, there has been growing conflict and 
confusion in more recent years over the division of power over 
western waters. The source of this conflict, the federal reluctance to 
submit to state water law for a determination of federal water needs 
and, potentially more important, the need for reform in state and na-
tional water policies, suggests that in the future the federal govern-
ment may seek to take a more active role in western water alloca-
tions. While the federal government almost certainly has the poten-
tial power to take a more active role, it seems unlikely that new 
federal legislation authorizing the use of that power will be passed in 
the near future. Therefore, the federal government may seek to 
assert a greater degree of control over western water allocations 
through already existing statutes. The remainder of the article will 
examine one particular statute, section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors 
Act of 1899, which was recently applied to a western water alloca-
tion project, to see the degree to which that Act may apply to state 
water allocations and provide the mechanism for increased federal 
control over western waters. 
III. SECTION 10 OF THE RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT OF 1899 
A. The Act Generally 
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899144 (RHA) is the principal 
federal law for the protection of our nation's navigable waterways 
141. Aiken, supra note 11, at 328. 
142. [d. at 328-29. 
143. See supra text and notes at notes 42-48, 134 (states have taken some steps toward 
reform). 
144. 33 u.s.c. §§ 401, 403-404, 406-409, 411 (1976). 
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from obstructions. 145 Two factors prompted the initial passage of the 
RHA.146 First, there was a growing recognition of the need to pro-
tect waterways from man-made obstructions. 147 Second, and more 
important, a series of Supreme Court cases had held that the federal 
government had no common law authority to protect navigable 
waters from obstructions.148 The RHA consists of several distinct 
provisions;149 this article will focus on section 10 of the Act.I50 
145. There are other federal laws which regulate development in and around navigable 
waters. See The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 
(1976) (regulating discharge of dredge or fill materials into navigable waters). 
The constitutional authority for the RHA is the federal commerce power. U.S. CaNsT. art. I, 
§ 18. That the commerce power included the powers to regulate and protect navigation and 
navigable waters was decided in 1824 by the Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, ~~2 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824); See also Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201 
(1967) (more recent affirmation of navigation power as the basis of law for the RHA). See infra 
text and notes at notes 195·230. 
146. The RHA was not the first attempt at regulation; it had its genesis in the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1890, ch. 907, 26 Stat. 426. The 1890 Act, however, proved unsatisfactory, be-
ing very poorly drafted. As a result, the 1899 Act was enacted to correct some of the :inadequa-
cies. See generally Barker, Sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899: Potent 
Tools for Environmental Protection, 6 ECOLOGY L. Q. 109, 111-15 (1976) (discussion of the 
evolution of the RHA and how it differs from the 1890 Act). See also infra text and notes at 
notes 244, 385-86. 
147. See G. KOONCE, FEDERAL LAWS AFFECTING RIVERS AND HARBORS WORKS (1926), 
reprinted in Water Pollution Control Legislation-1971 (Oversight of Existing Program): 
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 284, 287 (1971) 
[hereinafter cited as KOONCE LECTURE]; see generally Barker, supra note 146, at 111-12; 20 
Op. Att'y Gen. 448, 489-90 (1892). 
148. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888) (in the absence of a statutory 
enactment by Congress, state legislatures were free to authorize or prohibit the construction 
of dams and other structures in or over waters within the state, regardless of whether such 
structures obstructed navigation); Cardwell v. Am. Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205, 208 (1885). 
149. There are several other provisions which were part of the 1899 Act. Some of the more 
important of these sections include: 
Section 9 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1976)) outlines the requirements for approval of dams, 
dikes, bridges or causeways to be constructed over or in navigable waters. Before such struc-
tures can be erected permission must be granted by the Secretary of the Army and, depending 
on whether the waterway is interstate or not, by either Congress or the state as well; 
Section 11 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 404 (1976)) gives the Secretary of the Army the power to 
establish harbor lines beyond which no structures may extend. Section 10 permits are now re-
quired for structures within the harborlines, although they were not necessary until 1970. See 
infra text and note at note 447; 
Section 12 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1976)) makes violations of sections 9, 10, and 11 
criminal acts and imposes fines up to $2,500 or imprisonment or both. This provision also 
allows for the removal or treatment of offending structures. See infra text and notes at notes 
181-85; 
Section 13, commonly known as "The Refuse Act" (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1!176)) pro-
hibits the discharge of "any refuse matter of any kind or description" into navigable waters. 
See infra note 448. 
150. Section 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976) provides: 
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the 
navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; and it shall 
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Section 10 of the RHA is a "permit statute;" the structures and ac-
tivities enumerated in the provision are unlawful until the requisite 
permission is obtained.151 Section 10 consists of three clauses.152 The 
first clause contains a broad prohibition of all "obstructions" to the 
"navigable capacity" of any navigable water of the United States 
unless the obstruction is affirmatively authorized by Congress. 153 
The second clause restricts the building of "structures" such as 
wharves, piers, and breakwaters in navigable waters.154 The third 
clause restricts excavating, filling, or any other "work" which in any 
manner alters or modifies the course, condition, or capacity of any 
navigable waterway. 155 In contrast with the first clause restriction 
on obstructions which requires congressional approval, the struc-
tures and activities restricted under the latter two clauses can be ap-
proved by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). 156 As 
water allocation activities arguably fall within the restrictions of the 
third clause,157 and thereby require the approval of the Corps, it is 
important to outline the Corps' permit procedures. 
not be lawful to build or commence the building of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, 
weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any port, roadstead, haven, 
harbor, canal, navigable river, or other water of the United States, outside estab· 
lished harbor lines, or where no harbor lines have been established, except on plans 
recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the 
Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify 
the course, location, condition, or capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, 
canal, lake, harbor or refuge, or inclosure within the limits of any breakwater, or of 
the channel of any navigable water of the United States, unless the work has been 
recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army 
prior to beginning the same. 
151. Id. § 9, 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) is also a permit statute in form, but by its terms is limited 
to larger obstructions. It has limited applicability to state water allocations. See infra text and 
note at note 337 (§ 9 permit required for one of the structures originally at issue in Cal. v. 
Sierra Club). 
152. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976). See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960) 
(discussion of the three clause construction of § 10); see infra text and notes at notes 251·55, 
276·83 (for more detailed discussion of the three clause construction and the activities 
restricted under § 10). 
153. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976). 
154. Id. See 33 C.F.R. S 322.2(b) (1981) (definition of structures for the purposes of the 
Corps permit process). 
155. 33 U.S.C. S 403 (1976), see 33 C.F.R. § 322.2(c) (1981) (Corps' definition of third clause 
"work"). 
156. 33 U.S.C. S 403 (1976). In 1971, the Secretary of the Army delegated his authority to 
issue or deny S 10 permits to the Chief of Engineers and his authorized representative. 33 
C.F.R. S 322 (1981) (app. B). See also id. § 325.8 (1981) (S 10 permits to be authorized by Corps, 
not Secretary). The Corps does not have the authority to allow obstructions prohibited by the 
first clause of S 10; such obstructions can only be approved by Congress. See Wis. v. Ill., 278 
U.S. 367, 412·13 (1929). 
157. See infra text and notes at notes 269·75. 
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B. The Corps' Permit Process 
The traditional role of the Corps,158 and the one for which it is 
probably most noted, is that as a developer of water development 
projects.159 The Corps has been called the world's largest civil 
engineering firm.160 Since the original passage of the RHA in 
1890,161 the Corps has also had the major statutory responsibility for 
protection of the nation's waterways.162 The Corps' regulatory 
authority lies primarily in the permit process of the RHA 163 and sec-
tion 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.164 The Corps' 
regulations set out a detailed permit procedure165 for compliance 
with both of these statutes. 
In its most basic form, the permit process for activities under sec-
tion 10 operates in the following manner. When an activity requires 
Corps' authorization,166 the person or entity undertaking the activity 
must apply to the District Engineer for a permit.167 When a District 
Engineer receives a completed application, a public notice is general-
ly issued to notify all interested parties that the application has been 
made and to solicit the comments and information necessary to 
evaluate the probable impact of the proposed activity.168 The District 
158. The civil functions of the Department of the Army are carried out by the Corps. See 
Hoyer, Corps of Engineers Dredge and Fill Jurisdiction: Buttressing a Citadel Under Siege, 
26 U. FLA. L. REV. 19,20 (1973). 
159. The Corps was created by Congress in 1802. Act of Mar. 16, 1902, ch. 9, § 26,2 Stat. 
132, 137. Its original duties included construction of defense structures but evolved to encom-
pass primarily improvements in rivers and harbors and providing for flood control. See 
generally Power, The Fox in the Chicken Coop: The Regulatory Program of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, 63 VA. L. REV. 503, 504-07 (1977); Hoyer, supra note 158, at 20. 
160. See Power, supra note 159, at 504. 
161. See supra note 146. 
162. Hoyer, supra note 158, at 20. 
163. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, 407-408 (1976); see 33 C.F.R. § 320.2(a)-(f) (1981). 
164. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1976). This provision authorizes the Corps to issue permits for the 
discharge of dredge and fill material into the waters of the United States. See 33 C.F.R. § 
320.2(g) (1981); see generally Power, supra note 159, at 521-26. This article will not deal with 
the Corps' powers under § 404; see also § 103 of the Marine Protection, Researeh and Sanc-
tuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1413 (1976) (authority to issue permits for transportation of 
dredged material for ocean dumping). 
165. 33 C.F.R. §§ 320, 322, 325-329 (1981). 
166. At this point in the article only the basics are being laid out. This discussion presup-
poses jurisdiction of the Corps. See infra text and notes at notes 192-283 (for more detailed 
discussion of the territorial and subject matter jurisdiction of the Corps). 
167. 33 C.F.R. § 325.1(b) (1981). The application must include a complete description of the 
proposed activity; the location, purpose, and intended use of the proposed activity; and any 
other information that the District Engineer may require for his evaluation of the application. 
Such additional information may include environmental data and information on alternate 
methods and sites. Id. § 325.1(d). 
168. Id. § 325.3. There are exceptions to the general rule that public notice be given. For ex-
ample, when an activity can be validly authorized by a letter of permission, no public notice is 
necessary.ld. § 325.5(b). A letter of permission is issued if "in the opinion of the District Engi-
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Engineer must also prepare an environmental assessment169 and 
make a determination as to whether a public hearing is necessary.170 
Upon completion of these preliminary steps, the District Engineer 
begins the process of determining whether a permit should issue. 
The decision is based on an evaluation of the proposed activity and of 
the potential impact of that activity on the public interest. 171 To 
evaluate the proposed activity, the Corps considers certain general 
criteria such as the extent of the need, the desirability of alter-
natives, and the cumulative effect of the activities authorized.172 In 
addition to these general criteria, the public interest requires con-
sideration of all specific factors relevant to the particular case, in-
cluding such matters as conservation, economics, and fish and 
wildlife values. 173 In making this broad review of the public interest, 
the Corps must consider all comments received in response to the 
public notice174 and consult with the appropriate federal and state 
agencies. 175 After considering all relevant factors, the District 
neer, the proposed work is minor, will not have significant impact on environmental values, 
and should encounter no opposition, the District Engineer may omit the publishing of a public 
notice and authorize the work by a letter of permission." [d. 
169. [d. § 325.2(a)(4). The Environmental Assessment is the first step in the two-step proc-
ess of determining whether an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is necessary. [d. 
§ 325.4(b)(1). See infra text and notes at notes 300-04 (more detailed discussion of the process 
by which it is decided whether an EIS is required). 
170. 33 C.F.R. § 327 (1981). 
171. [d. § 320.4. See generally Power, supra note 159, at 528-30,547-56 (Professor Power 
discusses and critiques the permit process). 
172. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(2) (1981). 
[d. 
The following general criteria will be considered in the evaluation of every applica-
tion: 
(i) The relative extent of the public and private need for the proposed structure 
or work; 
(ii) The desirability of using appropriate alternative locations and methods to 
accomplish the objective of the proposed structure or work; 
(iii) The extent and permanence of the beneficial and/or detrimental effects 
which the proposed structure or work may have on the public and private uses to 
which the area is suited; and 
(iv) The probable impact of each proposal in relation to the cumulative effect 
created by other existing and anticipated structures or work in the general area. 
173. [d. § 320.4(a)(1). 
All factors which may be relevant to the proposal must be considered; among those 
are conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns, historic 
values, fish and wildlife values, flood damage prevention, land use, navigation, 
recreation, water supply, water quality, energy needs, safety, food production, and, 
in general, the needs and welfare of the people. No permit will be granted unless its 
issuance is found to be in the public interest. 
[d. See also id. § 320.4(b) (special consideration is to be given to wetlands if they are implicated 
in the proposed activity). 
174. [d. § 325.2(a)(3). 
175. [d. § 320.4(c). The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. § 742(a) (1976), re-
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Engineer determines whether a permit should issue.176 The District 
Engineer has the authority to issue,177 deny,178 or conditionl79 per-
mits for section 10 activities. All such decisions to grant or deny per-
mits are open to challenge by applicants.18o 
Enforcement of the RHA is conducted solely by the Corps.181 
Failure to apply for a permit is a criminal violation; the guilty party 
may be punished by fine and/or a court order to abate the unauthor-
ized structure. 182 When the Corps becomes aware of unauthorized 
activities it may conduct an investigation and decide on a course of 
action.183 The District Engineers have the discretionary power to 
quires the Corps to consult with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, National Marine 
Fisheries Service, and the appropriate state agencies when deciding whether to grant a per-
mit. 33 C.F.R. § 320.3 (1981) (list of related legislation, much of which requires consultation 
with other agencies and other statutory requirements). [d. § 320.4G) (consultation with state 
agencies and consideration of its laws). See generally Power, supra note 159, at 547-56. Pro-
fessor Power sees the Corps' role in the permit process as a mediator. The circulation of the 
permit application among various state and federal agencies is, in his view, the major strength 
of the process; in this circulation the permit is looked at from different perspectives and, 
accordingly, with different emphasis. 
176. 33 C.F.R. § 325.8(b) (1981). If another federal agency objects to issuance and wants to 
refer it to a higher level of authority for review, the District Engineer may not issue the per-
mit. [d. 
177. [d. § 325.8(b). There are three forms of § 10 authorizations. 
1.) Individual permits-a standard form permit issued for a particular project after an in-
dividual evaluation. 
2.) Letters of permission, see supra note 168. 
3.) General Permits-after compliance with all procedures of the regulations, the District 
Engineer may issue a general permit. After a general permit has been issued, individual ac-
tivities falling within those categories that are authorized by such general permits do not have 
to be further authorized unless the District Engineer determines, on a case-by-case basis that 
the public interest requires an indvidual permit. 
[d. § 325.5(a). 
178. [d. § 325.8(b). A permit may be denied if it is found to be not in the public interest for 
the application to be granted. 
179. [d. District Engineers may condition permits as necessary to protect the public in-
terest. See also id. § 325.6-.7 (permits may be given subject to automatic expiration or revoca-
tion). . 
180. An unsuccessful applicant has standing to challenge a final agency decision under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976), but in order to prevail the applicant 
must show that the administrative decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion 
or otherwise not in accordance with law." [d. § 706(2)(A). See, e.g., DiVosta Rentals, Inc. v. 
Lee, 488 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 984 (1974). Challenges may be 
mounted on other grounds as well, such as lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. 
Alexander, 613 F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1979); cf United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 
F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976) (the court rejected argument that canals were not within the Corps' 
jurisdiction). 
181. 33 C.F.R. § 326 (1981) outlines the enforcement mechanism of the Corps. After Cal. v. 
Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981), private parties may no longer bring a suit to enforce the 
RHA. See supra text and notes at notes 24-25, and infra text and notes at notes 372-74. 
182. 33 U.S.C. S 406 (1976). See supra note 149. 
183. 33 C.F.R. § 326.3 (1981). 
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take legal action184 or to grant an after-the-fact permit.185 
In its most basic form then, the RHA is a regulatory statute which 
seems relatively simple; certain obstructions to navigable waters are 
prohibited unless approved. Nothing on the face of the statute sug-
gests that section 10 could be used by the federal government to take 
a more active role in western water allocations. However, the expan-
sive language of section 10 provides little guidance as to the actual 
extent of the Act's coverage.186 This lack of clarity in its draftsman-
ship has caused many difficulties of interpretation. 187 The legislative 
history of the statute provides little help in resolving the 
ambiguities;188 all that is clear from the legislative history is that the 
statute was enacted to protect the navigability of the nation's water-
ways.189 Therefore, one must look beyond the statute to court deci-
sions and Corps' practice to determine the scope of the Act's 
coverage. In resolving the interpretive problems of section 10, the 
courts have consistently read the statute broadly to effectuate its 
purpose190 and have more recently expanded that purpose. 191 In 
184. Id. § 326.4. 
185. Id. § 326.5. The processing of the "after-the-fact applications" follows the standard 
procedures set out in the regulations and discussion above. If authorization of an after-the-fact 
permit is not in the public interest, the denial of permit will prescribe the corrective action that 
must be taken in connection with the work already completed. After a denial the possibility of 
legal action is again considered. 
186. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976), see supra note 150 for text. 
187. See, e.g., United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); Wis. v. Ill., 278 
U.S. 367 (1929); see also United States v. Moran Towing & Transp. Co., 374 F.2d 656,670 (4th 
Cir. 1967) (J. Sobeloff, dissenting) ("clarity of draftmanship is not a hallmark of the Act"). 
188. The legislative history of the RHA is sparse due to the circumstances of the Act's 
passage. The RHA was a last minute addition to the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Appropriations 
Act. See KOONCE LECTURE, supra note 147, at 288. The new provisions were represented as 
containing no significant changes of earlier laws, 32 CONGo REC. 2923 (1899) (statement of con-
ference committee), and the Senate adopted them without having heard them read out loud. 
Id. at 2297. As a result there was little debate. In addition, the Act, notwithstanding the pro-
testations of its sponsors, did contain significant changes. See Comment, Sections 9 and 10 of 
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899: The Erosion of Administrative Control By Environmental 
Suits, 1980 DUKE L. J. 170, 180-81. See infra text and notes at notes 385-86. 
189. See Wyandotte Transp. CO. V. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201 (1967). See supra text 
and notes at notes 146-48. See generally Comment, supra note 188. 
190. E.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co., 389 U.S. at 201. The Court said, "despite some dif-
ficulties with the wording of the Act, we have consistently found its coverage to be broad." In 
United States V. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 491 (1960), the Court stated: 
We read the 1899 Act charitably in light of the purpose to be served. The philosophy 
of the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes inNewJerseyv. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342, 
that a river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure, forbids a narrow, cramped 
reading either of § 13 or of § 10. 
See also United States v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 480 F.2d 1132,1133 (2d Cir. 1973); United States 
V. Ohio Barge Lines, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 1023, 1025-26 (W.D. Pa. 1977). But see infra text and 
notes at notes 221-31. 
191. See, e.g., Zabel V. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). 
See infra text and notes at notes 292-313. 
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order to see how the RHA may apply to western water allocation 
projects it is thus necessary to examine the scope of the Corps' ter-
ritorial and subject matter jurisdiction under the Act as it has been 
determined by the courts. In addition, the scope of the Corps' public 
interest review powers will be examined at greater length. 
C. The Jurisdictional Reach of the RHA 
An activity is not subject to the permit requirements of section 10 
unless it comes within the jurisdictional reach of the Corps under the 
RHA. The prerequisites for Corps' jurisdiction under the RHA are 
twofold.192 First, the structure or activity must be within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the Corps; it must be in or affect a navigable 
waterway. Second, the structure or activity in question must be 
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Corps; it must be one 
restricted by section 10. In order to see the breadth of the Corps' 
jurisdiction under the Act, and therefore section 10's potential ap-
plicability to state water allocations, it is necessary to examine both 
aspects of the Act's coverage in greater detail. 
1. Territorial Jurisdiction 
Only those waterways which are "navigable waters of the United 
States" come under the protective jurisdiction of the Corps under 
section 10.193 The limits of this territorial jurisdiction, however, have 
been the subject of much dispute and consequent interpretation at 
the hands of the courts.194 An analysis of the present breadth of the 
territorial jurisdiction of the Corps requires the consideration of two 
distinct questions. First, what waterways are deemed to be 
navigable waters of the United States? Second, what are the bound-
aries of these navigable waters for jurisdictional purposes? 
a. Navigable Waters of the United States 
The Corps' power over the nation's waters stems from the Com-
merce Clause.195 As a consequence, this power extends only to navi-
gable waters.196 Therefore, the test of what makes a waterway navi-
192. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976). 
193. [d. See supra note 150 for text of section 10. 
194. See, e.g., United States v. Diamond, 512 F.2d 157,160 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 928 (1975); Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. Alexander, 613 F.2d 1054, 1057-66 (D.C. Cir. 1979); 
United States v. DeFelice, 641 F.2d 1169,1174-75 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 325 (1981). 
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 18. See supra note 14 for brief discussion of the other bases for 
federal power over waters. 
196. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); see generally 
Morreale, supra note 135. 
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gable at law is important not only in the context of the RHA,197 but 
to all other assertions of federal dominion over water under the com-
merce power .198 
The "classic formulation" of what makes a waterway navigable at 
law, and therefore within the reach of federal power under the Com-
merce Clause, was set by the Supreme Court in 1851 in The Daniel 
Ball.199 In that case, the Court construed the reach of two statutes 
which regulated ships moving on the "navigable waters of the 
United States."200 The Court held that a waterway would come 
within the scope of these statutes if it satisfied two requirements. 
First, the waterway had to be "navigable in fact;" it had to be 
susceptible for use as a "highway for commerce."201 Second, the 
Court held that a waterway which was navigable in fact would be a 
"navigable waterway of the United States" within the meaning of 
the two statutes if it formed a continuous water highway over which 
commerce could be carried between states.202 Both aspects of The 
Daniel Ball formulation have proven important to the definition of 
the territorial jurisdiction of the Corps under the RHA. 
The first part of The Daniel Ball test, the test of "navigability in 
fact," has been the basis for determining the extent of the federal 
navigation power in general20a and, until recently, seemed to define 
197. The RHA is based on the commerce power. See supra note 145. 
198. Because of their common issue-namely, what is navigable water-many of the cases 
which make up the basis of the definition of navigable waters are not cases dealing with the 
RHA. Except insofar as more recent cases have limited the Act's coverage to waterways 
which are "navigable waters of the United States," see infra text and notes at notes 221-32, 
the RHA's territorial jurisdiction has expanded as the general definition of navigable waters 
has expanded. 
199. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563-64 (1870). 
200. Id. at 562-64. The Court was interpreting the Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 191, § 2, 5 Stat. 
304 (which required licenses for ships carrying cargo or passengers on "navigable waters of 
the United States"), and the Act of Aug. 30, 1852, ch. 106, 10 Stat. 61 (which compelled a 
limited safety inspection for ships moving on "navigable waters of the United States"). 
201. The Court stated: 
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable 
in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being 
used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and 
travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. 
77 U.S. at 563. See also The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 440-42 (1874). 
202. 77 U.S. at 63. The Court said: 
Id. 
And they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of the 
Acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when 
they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, 
a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried. 
203. In other words, if a waterway is navigable in fact, the federal government has power 
over its entire course under its navigation power. See supra text and notes at notes 195-98. 
See, e.g., Okla. ex reI. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941); United States v. 
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). 
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the scope of the territorial jurisdiction under the RHA as well.204 As 
defined in The Daniel Ball, to be navigable in fact, a waterway had to 
carry or be susceptible of carrying interstate commerce in the pres-
ent.205 Since that decision, the definition of navigability in fact has 
expanded on two points: first, what constitutes interstate eommerce; 
and second, when does the waterway have to support the interstate 
commerce. Virtually any kind of interstate commerce is now enough 
to satisfy the test of navigability in fact. For example, in United 
States v. Appalachian Electric Power CO.,206 the Supreme Court 
found a sufficient degree of commerce in the historical use of canoes, 
bateaux, and other frontier craft on the waterway. 207 In other cases, 
logs floating downstream presented sufficient evidence of com-
merce208 and use of recreational craft showed the potential for com-
merce.209 Further, the waterway does not have to be capable of sup-
porting commerce in the present. In Economy Light & Power Co. v. 
United States, 210 the Court held that once a waterway has supported 
interstate commerce it always remains a navigable river for the pur-
pose of federal control.211 The Court, in United States v. Ap-
204. See, e.g., James River and Kanawha Canal Parks, Inc. v. Richmond Metropolitan 
Auth., 359 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va.), afi'd per cur., 481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973) (a parking lot 
is not a navigable waterway); United States v. Diamond, 512 F.2d 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 928 (1975); United States v. Cannon, 363 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Del. 1973). But see infra 
text and notes at notes 221-3l. 
205. See supra note 20l. It is important to distinguish the two requirements. Under The 
Daniel Ball definition of "navigability in fact," the waterway must be capable of carrying in-
terstate commerce. Under the definition of "navigable waters of the United States," see infra 
text and notes at notes 221-31, the waters themselves must be capable of carrying commerce 
interstate. 
Under the present definition of navigability in fact, which has expanded much as the federal 
power under the commerce clause has expanded, the waterway need not be an interstate 
waterway. Only those goods which are carried, were carried, or may be carried on the water-
way need theoretically move in interstate commerce. See generally Morreale, supra note 135. 
206. 311 U.S. 377 (1940). 
207. Id. at 414-16. 
208. Compare St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm., 168 U.S. 349, 
359 (1897) Oogs floating downstream are sufficient to show commerce if connected with a com-
mercial venture), with United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899) 
(it is not enough that logs float downstream at high water). See also 33 C.F.R. § 329.6(a) 
(1981). 
209. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82 (1931); see also 33 C.F.R. § 329.6(a) (1981) ("the 
presence of recreational craft may indicate that a water body is capable of bearing some forms 
of commerce, either presently, in the future, or at a past point in time"). 
210. 256 U.S. 113 (1921). In this case, the United States had invoked § 9 of the RHA, 33 
U.S.C. § 401 (1981), to prevent construction of a dam in the Des Plaines River. 
211. 256 U.S. at 123-25. The Des Plaines River had been used in the past, from about the 
late 17th century to the first quarter of the 19th century, by early trappers in canoes and other 
boats having light drafts. Id. at 117. But the river, at the time of the decision, had not been 
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palachian Electric Power CO.,212 went even further. It held that a 
waterway, otherwise nonnavigable, is navigable if reasonable im-
provements or artificial aids would make it SO.213 Courts have also 
made it clear that a waterway need not be natural in order to be con-
sidered navigable at law. Artificial waterbodies, such as canals, are 
subject to Corps' jurisdiction if they are navigable in fact.214 The 
present test of navigability in fact is thus quite broad compared to 
that formulated by The Daniel Ball court. 
The definition of navigability in fact, as it has evolved since The 
Daniel Ball, can thus be summarized as a three part test. A water-
way is navigable in fact if (1) it is presently being used or is suitable 
for use, or (2) it has been used or was suitable for use in the past, or 
(3) it could be made suitable for use in the future with reasonable im-
provements. 215 A waterway is navigable in fact if it satisfies anyone 
prong of this past, present, or future test of commercial use. This 
formulation has been followed by most courts216 and has been 
adopted by the Corps in its regulations. 217 As a result, virtually all 
but the most insignificant streams are navigable in fact and thus 
within the federal navigation power. 218 One commentator has sug-
gested that realistically, navigability is now no more than a base that 
courts and Congress feel obligated to touch when clearing the path 
for federal programs involving use and control of waters.219 Thus, 
used commercially for over 100 years. It fell into disuse as physical changes and man-made 
obstructions made commercial use impracticable, if not impossible. See also United States v. 
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 408 (1940). 
212. 311 U.S. 397 (1940). 
213. [d. at 407. 
214. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (privately developed 
marina held to be navigable under the RHA); see also 33 C.F.R. § 329.8(a) (1981) (the artificial 
waterway must be capable of use to support interstate commerce. Canals which connect two 
navigable waters are navigable as is a canal open on only one end which supports interstate 
commerce); see generally Power, supra note 159, at 518-20. 
215. Rochester Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm., 344 F.2d 594,596 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 382 U.S. 832 (1965). 
216. See, e.g., Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900, 908 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'd 
on other grounds, 396 U.S. 212 (1969); Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr. and Assoc., Inc., 328 F. 
Supp. 54, 60 (W.D. Ark. 1971). 
217. 33 C.F.R. 329.4 (1981). 
218. See generally Hoyer, supra note 158, at 23; Morreale, supra note 135. But see United 
States v. Crow, Pope & Land Enterprises, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Ga. 1972), app. dis-
missed, 474 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1972). 
219. Hoyer, supra note 158, at 23. See also Leighty, The Source and Scope of Public and 
Private Rights in Navigable Waters, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 391, 436 (1970). 
Despite the breadth of the past, present, and future test of navigability, the doctrine is not 
without limits. The absurdities that could result from literal application of the present test 
prompted one court to say: H[T]his Court cannot overlook the simple fact that the geographic 
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the requirement that a waterway be navigable in fact before coming 
under the protection of the RHA poses a rather insignificant limita-
tion on Corps' jurisdiction. 
Until recently, the Corps' jurisdiction over a waterway could be 
established merely by a showing that a waterway was navigable in 
fact.22o The Daniel Ball221 held, however, that "navigable waters of 
the United States" are those waterways which are navigable in fact 
and which form, by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a 
continuous interstate water highway.222 Until recently, the second 
part of The Daniel Ball test for "navigable waters of the United 
States" did not play a decisive role in any cases.223 Several recent 
circuit court decisions have held, however, that the Corps may not 
assert jurisdiction under section 10 unless both parts of The Daniel 
Ball test are satisfied.224 The cases maintain that the phrase 
"navigable waters of the United States," as defined in The Daniel 
Ball, had acquired a "well settled judicial meaning" by tne time the 
RHA was enacted. 226 Accordingly, every circuit court addressing the 
issue has held226 that use of this phrase in the RHA227 indicates that 
entity in question in this case is a parking lot, and a parking lot, despite the most sophisticated 
legal arguments, buttressed by the most vivid of imaginations, is not a navigable water of the 
United States." James River and Kanawha Canal Parks, Inc. v. Richmond Metropolitan Auth., 
359 F. Supp. 611, 640 (E.D. Va.), affd, 481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973) (the lot had been a canal 
before 1880). See also United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 610·11 (3d Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975) (the Corps lacks authority over tidal wetlands that 
became fastland prior to Corps' assertion of regulatory power in the area); 33 C.F .. R. § 329.13 
(1981). 
220. See supra note 204. 
221. 77 U.S. (10 Wall) 557, 563-64 (1970). See .supra text and notes at notes 1!19-202. 
222. See supra text and note at note 202. 
223. Several cases after The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874), quoted the language 
containing the second part of the test but none relied on it. See, e.g., United States v. Ap-
palachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). 
The District of Columbia Circuit in Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. Alexander, 613 F.2d 1054, 1063 
(D.C. Cir. 1979), suggested that this silence as to the second part of the test is due to the fact 
that all that was at issue in the many intervening cases was navigability in fact, The court 
noted that no case had been found which expanded the definition of "navigable waters of the 
United States" by dropping the requirement of an interstate connection by water. 
224. Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. Alexander, 613 F.2d 1054, 1057-66 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Minnehaha 
Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 621-24 (8th Cir. 1979); Hardy Salt Co. v. S. 
Pacific Transp. Co., 501 F.2d 1156, 1167-68 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974). 
225. See supra cases cited at note 224. The Court in Alexander makes this argument most 
forcefully with a detailed discussion of the federal regulation of internal navigation before 
1890 which focuses on the decisions in The Daniel Ball and The Montello. Alexande'r, 613 F .2d 
at 1057-62. 
226. See supra cases cited note 224; see also United States v. DeFelice, 641 F.2d 1169, 
1174-75 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, _ U.S. _,102 S.Ct. 474 (1981). This case, however, finds 
navigability under the RHA strictly on the old ebb and flow test while seemingly approving the 
Alexander approach for "landlocked, non-tidal waterbodies." 
227. See supra note 150 for text of section 10. 
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the framers of the statute intended the coverage of the Act to be 
limited by both parts of The Daniel Ball test. 228 To date, the Corps 
has not explicitly adopted this interpretation of its territorial 
jurisdiction.229 It is difficult to judge what practical consequences230 
the revival of the second part of The Daniel Ball test will have on the 
extent of the Corps' jurisdiction under the RHA; it remains a largely 
undefined limitation on jurisdiction. Thus far, only totally landlocked 
intrastate lakes have been found to be outside Corps' jurisdiction 
under the bipartite test. 231 Even with this additional limitation, 
however, the territorial jurisdiction of the Corps is quite broad. 
b. The Boundaries of Navigable Waters 
The requirement that a waterway be a navigable water of the 
United States is the threshold issue of territorial jurisdiction under 
the RHA. Once a waterway meets this requirement, it is clearly 
228. Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. Alexander, 613 F.2d at 1061-62. The court cites a debate in the 
House prior to passage of the 1890 Rivers and Harbors Act which quoted The Daniel Ball and 
its construction of the navigable waters of the United States. See also 20 Op. Att'y Gen. 101, 
105 (1891) (the earliest reported interpretation of the 1890 Act by the Attorney General used 
the language of The Daniel Ball in deciding whether particular rivers were navigable waters 
of the United States). 
When words used in a statute have a well settled judicial meaning at the time the statute was 
enacted, courts presume that the legislature intended to continue the existing interpretation in 
the new statute absent contextual or historical evidence to the contrary. See, e.g., Case v. Los 
Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115 (1939); The Abbotsford, 98 U.S. 440, 444 
(1878). 
229. The current Corps' regulations are in fact in direct opposition to this view. 33 C.F.R. 
§ 329.7 (1981). The regulations state: "Nor is it necessary that there be a physically navigable 
connection across a state boundary." Id. 
230. This limitation of Corps' jurisdiction, however, must be noted for its less tangible im-
plications. First, it must be noted as virtually the only exception to the generally consistent, 
broad reading the statute has received over its long history. See supra text and note at note 
190. This "revival" of the second prong of The Daniel Ball test, in conjunction with the recent 
decision in Cal. v. Sierra Club, discussed infra at notes 372-74, may mark the beginning of a 
trend to define the outer limits of the RHA. 
Second, on a less speculative level, this limiting construction of the territorial jurisdiction of 
the RHA indicates that the RHA, despite its expansion, does not have the reach that new 
legislation passed under the commerce clause would have; rather, it will be held to be limited, 
in at least some ways, by the law which prevailed at the time of its passage. For example, in 
Hardy Salt Co. v. S. Pacific Transp. Co., 501 F.2d 1156, 1169 (10th Cir. 1974), the court 
stated: "And we need not and do no[t] [sic] decide whether the Congress could constitutionally 
regulate commerce on the Lake." See also Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. Alexander, 613 F.2d 1054, 
1060 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States V. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 608-09 (3d Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975). See infra text and notes at notes 458-66 for discussion 
of what this aspect of the RHA may mean to its potential utilization as a tool for greater 
federal regulation of state water allocation projects. 
231. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed. V. Alexander, 613 F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Devils Lake, 
while navigable in fact and large, was located wholly in North Dakota; no stream or river 
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within the Corps' protective jurisdiction under the Act. Two impor-
tant and distinct questions remain as to the scope of the Corps' 
jurisdiction over a navigable waterway. First, what are the physical 
boundaries of a navigable waterway for jurisdictional purposes? Sec-
ond, to what extent may the Corps' restrict activities which are not 
within navigable waters? 
There has been much litigation in recent years over the physical 
boundaries of navigable waters. Specifically, questions have devel-
oped over where the navigable water ends and the land, which is 
generally outside Corps' jurisdiction, begins. 232 Most of the disputes 
have arisen in the context of the development of wetland or tidal 
marsh areas adjacent to navigable waters.233 The Corps' regulations 
reflect the prevailing judicial interpretation of what the shoreward 
extent of a navigable water should be. 234 In the case of nontidal 
waters,235 such as rivers and streams, navigable water is considered 
to extend to the "ordinary high water mark."236 All activities pro-
hibited by section 10 and located below the ordinary high water mark 
are thus subject to the permit requirements of the RHA whether or 
not the water at that point is navigable.237 As a result of this defini-
tion, the Corps has been able to assert its jurisdiction to protect 
wetlands and tidal marshes, regardless of their past, present, or 
future susceptibility to navigation. 238 
flowed in or out of the lake that was navigable out of state); Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. 
v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1979) (totally intrastate lake, only an unnavigable creek 
flowed out of it); Hardy Salt Co. v. S. Pacific Transp. Co., 501 F.2d 1156 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974) (Great Salt Lake of Utah). 
232. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 19'76) (Moret-
ti II); Leslie Salt Co. v. Froelke, 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Baker, 1 ENVT'L 
L. REP. 20,378 (S.D. N.Y. 1971). 
233. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973) (Moretti 
I). But much litigation has also involved the question of whether canals, dredged shoreward of 
navigable waters come within the Corps' jurisdiction. E.g., United States v. Sexton Cove 
Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976). 
234. 33 C.F.R. § 329.11 (1981). 
235. For tidal waters the shoreward limit of jurisdiction extends to the line on the shore 
reached by the plane of the mean (average) high water. [d. § 329.12(a). 
236. The ordinary high water mark 
is the line on the shore established by the fluctuations of water and indicated by 
physical characteristics such as a clear, natural line impressed on the bank; shelving; 
changes in the character of soil; destruction of terrestrial vegetation; the presence of 
litter and debris; or other appropriate means that consider the characteristics of the 
surrounding areas. 
[d. § 329.11; see United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967); United States v. Va. Elec. & 
Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 628 (1961). 
237. See, e.g., Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915). See general-
ly, Barker, supra note 146, at 125. 
238. This definition of the geographic extent of Corps' jurisdiction, in conjunction with the 
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The second and more important question about the potential ap-
plicability of the RHA to water allocation projects is the extent to 
which the Corps' may require permits for activities that do not take 
place in navigable waterways.239 Courts have found that the Corps' 
jurisdiction extends to activities in the nonnavigable portions of 
waterways240 and to activities shoreward of the ordinary high water 
mark241 if those activities affect a navigable waterway.242 The 
leading case on this point is United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Ir-
rigation CO.243 This case involved the applicability of the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1890244 to a dam in a nonnavigable portion of a river. 
The Supreme Court held that the location of an obstruction was not 
the sole determinant of the applicability of the Act. The Court in-
stead found that the proper way to view the restrictions of the Act 
was to look at the effect of the particular obstruction on the 
navigable portion of the river.246 Thus, before the dam in question 
expansion of the decision criteria, see infra text and notes at notes 292-313 and supra text and 
notes at notes 145-80, has made the Corps' regulatory program under § 10 an important tool 
for protection of wetlands. See 2 CLARK, supra note 27, at 5-17 (1978 Supp.). See generally, 
Barker, supra note 146; Casto, The Use of the Corps of Engineers Permit Authority as a Tool 
for Defending the Environment, 11 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1971); Kramon, Section 10 of the 
Rivers and Harbors Act: The Emergence of a New Protection for Tidal Marshes, 33 MD. L. 
REV. 229 (1973). 
239. See infra text and notes at notes 314-32 for discussion of the factual background of Cal. 
v. Sierra Club. The water diversion activity involved in that case, and much of the water diver-
sion activity in the west, does not occur in navigable waterways. Rather, the water is diverted 
from streams and tributaries which feed into navigable waters. The only way the Corps can 
get jurisdiction over these diversions is to allege that they have impermissible impact on the 
navigable portions of the waterway. See infra text and notes at notes 276-83 for a discussion of 
what degree of effect must be shown. 
240. See, e.g., United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899) (a 
dam in the nonnavigable portion of a river found to come under the RHA); United States v. 
Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964) (defendants' overloading of land with bricks, 
granite, and fill was alleged to have caused shoaling in an adjacent channel); Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610(N.D. Cal. 1975), rev'din part, affdinpart sub nom., Sierra Club v. 
Andrus, 610 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Cal. v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
See infra text and notes at notes 314-74. 
241. See, e.g., United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976); 
Weismann v. Dist. Eng'r, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976); United 
States v. Bailey, 467 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Ark. 1979). 
242. See infra text and notes at notes 276-83, for discussion of the degree of effect on the 
navigable waterway which must be shown. 
243. 174 U.S. 690 (1899). 
244. Ch. 907, 26 Stat. 426 (1890). This case dealt with § 10 of the 1890 Act which had 
language very similar to the language now present in the first clause of § 10 of the present 
RHA. See supra text and note at note 146. The Supreme Court has held that the prohibitions 
of the two Acts are very similar. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 486 
(1960) ("[c]ertainly so far as outlawry of any 'obstructions' in navigable rivers is concerned 
there was no change relevant to our present problem"). 
245. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 708 (1899). 
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could be constructed there would have to be an inquiry into whether 
it would substantially diminish the navigability of the river.246 More 
recent cases have expanded the Corps' jurisdiction under the third 
clause of section 10 based on reasoning similar to that of the 
Supreme Court in Rio Grande; these cases focused on the effect of 
the activity rather than its location.247 
To summarize, it seems clear that the Corps' jurisdiction under 
section 10 is quite broad; a significant portion of the waters of the 
United States will qualify as navigable waters and thus come under 
the protection of the Act. In addition, the Corps' jurisdiction extends 
to activities located outside the boundaries of navigable waters 
which affect navigable waters and to activities or structures in non-
navigable areas which come within the broadly defined boundaries of 
navigable waters. It is important to note, however, that courts have 
imposed some limits on the territorial jurisdiction of the RHA; the 
scope of the RHA does not equal that of the modern federal naviga-
tion power.248 Once the waterways covered by the RHA are defined, 
the next task is to examine the subject matter jurisdiction of the Act 
and discover what protection the RHA provides to waterways. 
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Corps Under Section 10 
The RHA does not protect navigable waters from all types of 
harm. Section 10 sets out the structures and activities which may not 
lawfully be constructed or conducted without prior Corps' 
approva1.249 As was the case with territorial jurisdiction, however, 
the RHA does not define well the scope of its coverage, and the 
legislative history offers little guidance on Congress' intent in this 
regard.250 In order to get a sense of the breadth of the statute's sub-
ject matter coverage, and the possible extent of its applieability to 
water allocation projects, it is necessary to examine how courts have 
interpreted this aspect of the coverage of section 10 in the past. 
As discussed above,251 section 10 of the RHA consists of three 
246. Id. at 710. 
247. See supra cases cited at note 241. See also United States v. Joseph G. l\'!orretti, Inc., 
526 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1976); Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
The court in Sexton Cove Estates, 526 F.2d at 1298 said: "The local origin of the activity or 
the source of its operation is thus not wholly determinative; of at least equal significance is the 
'effect.' " It is not clear how much effect on the navigable portions of a waterway must be in 
evidence before the Corps may assert jurisdiction. This is a focus of recent controversy which 
will be discussed at greater length below. See infra text and notes at notes 276-83. 
248. See supra note 230. 
249. See supra text anti notes at notes 150-57. 
250. See supra text and notes at notes 187-88. 
251. See supra text and notes at notes 152-55. 
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clauses restricting activities in the navigable waters of the United 
States. The first clause contains a broad prohibition of all "obstruc-
tions" to "navigable capacity;" the second clause restricts the 
building of "structures" such as wharves and piers; and the third 
clause restricts activities such as excavations and fills which alter or 
modify the condition or capacity of a navigable water. 252 Activities 
under the latter two clauses can be authorized by the Corps; ac-
tivities which constitute obstructions to navigable capacity, but do 
not come within the scope of the latter two clauses, must be ap-
proved by Congress.253 The determination of what activities are 
restricted under the broad language of section 10254 and the degree 
of authorization sufficient for those activities have provided inter-
pretative difficulties for courts over the history of section 10.255 As 
will be seen below, however, the courts have given the entire provi-
sion a generous reading. 
The term obstruction to navigable capacity, as used in the first 
clause of section 10, has been interpreted broadly by the courtS.256 In 
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 257 the Supreme 
Court found that the statute was applicable to a proposed dam in a 
nonnavigable part of a waterway by construing the "any obstruc-
tion" language in section 10 as prohibiting "anything, wherever 
done or however done . . . which tends to destroy the navigable 
capacity of one of the navigable waters of the United States. "258 The 
252. See supra note 150 for text of statute. 
253. [d. 
254. [d. See also KOONCE LECTURE, supra note 147, at 289 (Judge Koonce notes the broad 
language of the Act). 
255. The main difficulty in interpreting § 10 has stemmed from the ambiguity surrounding 
the interrelationship of the three clauses. The initial confusion was over what constituted prop-
er authorization for a structure or activity covered by the second and third clauses; early 
courts construed § 10 to require Congressional authorization for all activities within its scope. 
See, e.g., Hubbard v. Fort, 188 F. 987, 997 (C.C.D. N.J. 1911). The Supreme Court resolved 
this ambiguity in Wis. v. Ill., 278 U.S. 367, 412-13 (1929), in which it held that the obstructions 
within the purview of the second and third clauses need only be approved by the Corps of 
Engineers. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the second and third clauses, by requiring on-
ly Corps' authorization, are qualifications of the presumably more difficult approval re-
quirements of the first clause. [d. See infra text and notes at notes 276-83 for discussion of a 
more recent controversy arising out of the interrelationship of the clauses. 
256. See generally Comment, supra note 188; Barker, supra note 146; Kramon, supra note 
238. 
257. 174 U.S. 690 (1899). 
258. [d. at 708. The Court said: "The language is general, and must be given full scope. It is 
not a prohibition of any obstruction to the navigation, but any obstruction to the navigable 
capacity." [d. The Court in this case was construing § 10 of the 1890 Rivers and Harbors Act. 
But the words of that section are very similar to the words of the first clause of § 10 in the 1899 
Act and the Supreme Court has adapted the interpretation in Rio Grande in subsequent inter-
pretations of the RHA. See, e.g., United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. at 486. See 
supra note 244. 
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Court stressed that the criteria for determining whether the statute 
had been violated was the effect of the structure on navigable capaci-
ty.269 The Supreme Court has continued to read the "any obstruc-
tion" language broadly.260 
Given the Supreme Court's broad reading of the "any obstruction" 
language, lower courts have found that all manner of activities and 
structures come within the scope of section 10. For example, courts 
have imposed liability under section 10 for deliberately scuttling a 
ship in a navigable water,261 for dumping fill on land which caused 
shoaling in a nearby navigable water,262 and for diverting water.263 
All such obstructions to navigable capacity require congressional 
authorizations unless they are within the purview of the second and 
third clauses. In the latter case they need only be approved by the 
Corps of Engineers.264 In their analysis, then, the courts will 
generally look first at whether the particular obstruction comes 
within the scope of the second or third clauses. In ascertaining 
whether an obstruction is a "structure" under the second clause, 
courts have generally applied the customary definitions to the struc-
tures specified in that clause.266 In addition, the Corps' lieensing 
power in the second clause seems to relate only to structures 
259. The Court in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & [rrig. Co., said: 
[Ilt would be to improperly ignore the scope of this language to limit it to the acts 
done within the very limits of navigation of a navigable stream .... The question 
always is one of fact, whether such appropriation substantially interferes with the 
navigable capacity within the limits where navigation is a recognized fact. 
174 U.S. at 708-09. 
260. In Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925), the Court, inter-
preting the 1899 Act and citing Rio Grande with approval, characterized § 10 as a "broad ex-
pression of policy in unmistakable terms." [d. at 429. The Court, in this case relying on the 
third clause to find water diversions within the scope of § 10, read the entire section broadly. 
[d. See also Wis. v. Ill., 278 U.S. 367, 414 (1929) (specific reaffirmation of Sanita:ry Dist's 
broad construction of the first and third clauses in a related case). 
In United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960), the obstruction in question 
was caused by an unauthorized deposit of industrial wastes which caused a decrease in the 
depth of a navigable water . [d. The Court, in finding these deposits within the scope of the first 
clause, rejected arguments that the scope of § 10 was limited to the obstructions enumerated 
in the latter two clauses and that "obstruction" meant some kind of structure. [d. at 486-87. 
The Court held that the generalized prohibition of the first clause was aimed at protecting 
navigable capacity from the adverse effects of any activity. [d. 
261. United States v. Ravens, 500 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1974). 
262. United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964); see also United States 
v. Kane, 461 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (chain link fence caused obstruction). 
263. Sanitary Dist. ojChicago, 266 U.S. 405 (1925); see Conn. v. Mass., 282 U.S. 6150 (1931); 
34 Op. Att'y Gen. 410 (1925). 
264. See Wis. v. Ill., 278 U.S. 367, 412-13 (1929); United States v. Kane, 461 F. Supp. 554, 
556 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). 
265. See United States v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U.S. 211 (1900). 
1982] RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT 149 
touching navigable waters rather than structures affecting 
navigable waters.266 In this, the second clause differs from the first 
and third clauses. As a result, the second clause has not received the 
expansive interpretation that has been received by the third. 
The third clause explicitly restricts excavations and fills in 
navigable waters,267 but the clause also contains broader, less 
specific language, restricting work which "in any manner alters or 
modifies the course, location, condition or capacity" of a navigable 
water.268 This language has been read by the Supreme Court to ap-
ply to water diversions269 and by lower courts to apply to activities 
conducted outside the boundaries of navigable waters which alter or 
modify the condition or capacity of a navigable water. 270 
The leading case on this aspect of section 10 is Sanitary District of 
Chicago v. United States. 271 In this case involving unauthorized 
water diversions from Lake Michigan into a drainage canal,272 the 
Supreme Court held that the lowering of the lake constituted a 
change in the condition of the lake and, therefore, violated section 
10.273 More recent decisions, relying on the third clause of section 10, 
266. See supra note 150 for text of act. 
267. See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971); see 
also Am. Dredging Co. v. Dutchyshyn, 480 F. Supp. 957 (E.D. Pa. 1979); United States v. 
Weiszmann, 489 Supp. 1331 (M.D. Fla. 1980). 
268. That altering and modifying the course of a navigable water constitutes a separate of-
fense under the third clause, and is not merely stating different ways in which excavations and 
fills can affect a navigable water, has been long established. See F.D. Gleason Coal Co. v. 
United States, 30 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1929); United States v. Benton and Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 
1101 (M.D. Fla. 1972). The third clause is potentially limited to work within the "channel" of a 
navigable water. The courts have not, however, defined channel in the way it was in-
tended-the channel of navigation or customary route taken by ships. Instead, the courts have 
defined it as the bed of a stream between the two banks. See generally Kramon, supra note 
238, at 232-33. 
269. See Wis. v. III., 278 U.S. 367 (1929); Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 
U.S. 405 (1925); accord Conn. v. Mass., 282 U.S. 660 (1931). See also Cal. v. Sierra Club, 451 
U.S. 287 (1981) (discussed infra text and notes at notes 314-74). 
270. See, e.g., United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976); 
Weiszmann v. Dist. Eng'r, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976); United 
States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976). See infra text and notes at 
notes 314-74. 
271. 266 U.S. 405 (1925). 
272. [d. at 428-32. The Sanitary District had already received Corps' permission to divert a 
set amount of lake water, but applied for permission to divert more. The Secretary of War 
denied this application "on the overwhelming evidence that it would affect navigation." [d. at 
430-31. When the Sanitary district was found to be diverting more water than it was author-
ized to, the Secretary charged it with violation of § 10 and moved for an injunction. [d. 
273. [d. at 426, 428. In granting the injunction for failure to get Corps' authorization the 
Court said: "Evidence is sufficient, if evidence is necessary, to show that a withdrawal of 
water ... threatens and will affect the level of the lakes, and that is a matter which cannot be 
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have required Corps' approval for the dredging of canals outside the 
boundaries of navigable waters.274 The courts held that, if activities 
outside the boundaries of navigable waters were shown to have some 
third clause effect on navigable waters, then they would come within 
the jurisdiction of the Corps.275 A controversy recently emerged, 
however, over the degree of interference an activity would have to 
have on a navigable water before Corps' jurisdiction under the third 
clause would be triggered. 
The District Court in California v. Sierra Club,276 required a find-
ing of a substantial impact on the navigable capacity of the waterway 
before a Corps' permit would be necessary for the water diversions 
done without the consent of the United States, ... " Id. at 426 (emphasis added). The Court 
went on to say: "There is neither reason nor opportunity for a construction that would not 
cover the present case. As now applied it concerns a change in the condition of the Lakes ... , 
and, if that be necessary, an obstruction to their navigable capacity .... " Id. at 429 (emphasis 
added). In holding in this manner the Court indicates that water diversions come under the 
third clause and suggests strongly that such activities would come under Corps jurisdiction 
independent of any showing that the diversions threatened navigable capacity in the meaning 
of the first clause. In this case, evidence had apparently been presented that the withdrawals 
would effect navigation. Id. at 430. See infra text and notes at notes 276-83. 
274. See supra cases cited at note 270. 
275. In United States v. Joseph G. Morretti, Inc., 526 F.2d at 1309, the Fifth Circuit Court 
stated: 
[T]he Corps may under certain circumstances exercise jurisdiction over dredging and 
filling operations above MHTL under [§ 10] of the Rivers and Harbors Act. Prereq-
uisites for such jurisdiction are factual circumstances showing some effect upon 
navigable waters, some alteration or modification of either course, location, condi-
tion or capacity of those waters. These statutory terms are broad and undefined. So 
long as activities fall within this generous scope, those activities are subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Corps. 
Id. (emphasis added). See also Weiszmann, 526 F.2d at 1305 (the court found several canals 
connected to a navigable waterway to be within the Corps' jurisdiction under the third clause). 
The Supreme Court of Maine in Maine Water Co. v. Knickerbocker Steam Towage 
Co., 99 Me. 473, took the same general view in construction of the same seetion. It 
held that the broad words of the first clause of that section were not intended to limit 
the second and third clauses and that Congress's purpose was a direct prohibition of 
what was forbidden by them except when affirmatively approved by the Chief of 
Engineers and the Secretary of War. We concur in this view. 
278 U.S. 367, 413 (1929) (emphasis added). Similarly, in Sanitary Dist., 266 U.S. at 426,429, 
the Supreme Court found the water diversions to come under the third clause and indicated 
that, while evidence of obstruction to navigable capacity was present, a violation of the first 
clause was not necessary to their finding of a violation of § 10. See supra note 273. Finally, in 
Republic Steel, 363 U.S. at 486-87, the Supreme Court lent strong support to the notion that 
the activities mentioned in the second and third clauses are presumed to be obstructions to 
navigable capacity. The Court said: "[T]he first clause being specifically aimed at 'navigable 
capacity' .... " Id. 
276. Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1975). The factual background and 
decisions in this case, as well as the main issue left open will be discussed infra text and notes 
at notes 314-417. 
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at issue in that case.277 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit278 disagreed 
with this reading of the statute, holding instead that activities within 
the purview of the latter two clauses were presumed to be obstruc-
tions to navigable capacity and thus automatically subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Corps.279 In the view of the Ninth Circuit then, no 
finding of an obstruction to navigable capacity would be necessary to 
trigger the Corps' jurisdiction if the activity comes within the terms 
of the second or third clauses. The great weight of judicial 
authority280 and Corps' practice as reflected in its regulations281 sug-
277. The court said: "Under Section 10 ... the question before the court ... is whether the 
structure itself or its operational effect is an obstruction to the navigable capacity of any 
navigable water." 400 F. Supp. at 630. Implicit in the court's holding on this point is the 
assumption that the requirements of the third clause of § 10 are dependent on the first clause 
being operative. The court found the requisite obstruction to navigable capacity. [d. at 630-32. 
278. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd sub 'l'/,om. Cal. v. Sierra Club, 
451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
279. 610 F.2d at 594-95. The Court said: 
[d. 
[W]e interpret clauses 2 and 3 of section 10 as constituting a legislative enumeration 
of specific obstructions to navigable capacity that require Corps authorization. In 
other words, the building activities mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 are presumed to be 
obstructions to navigable capacity .... Thus, the facts in this case should be analyzed 
from the standpoint of whether there has been any modification or alteration of the 
condition or capacity of a navigable stream, rather than first determining whether 
there has been an obstruction to navigable capacity. 
280. The Supreme Court decisions dealing with § 10 tend to support the view that activities 
within the scope of the second and third clauses are directly prohibited, independent of the 
first clause, subject to the Corps' approval. 'In Wis. v. Ill. the Court said: 
[The clause] serves an end that may at times be broader than those served by the 
other clauses. Some structures mentioned in the second clause may only deter 
movements in commerce,falling short of adversely affecting navigable capacity. And 
navigable capacity of a waterway may conceivably be affected by means other than 
the excavation and fills mentioned in the third clause .... In short, the first clause is 
aimed at protecting 'navigable capacity,' though it is adversely affected in ways other 
than those specified in the other clauses. 
[d. at 486-87 (emphasis added). 
Numerous lower court decisions and the comments of one of the draftsmen also support the 
notion that the activities of the second and third clauses are subject to Corps' approval 
regardless of actual effect on navigable capacity. See supra cases cited at notes 270, 275. See 
also Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 207. "The Act covers both building of structures and the ex-
cavating and filling in navigable waters. It is structured as a flat prohibition unless- the unless 
being the issuance of approval by the Secretary after recommendation of the Chief of 
Engineers." [d.; United States v. Benton and Co., 345 F. Supp. 1101, 1104 (M.D. Fla. 1972). 
Finally, the views of one of the principal draftsmen of the Act also support the view of the 
circuit courts. Judge Koonce stated, "the effect of this latter clause is to necessitate the sub-
mission of every project of the kind to the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of War, and to 
commit to them the duty of investigating and determining whether or not the project will 
obstruct or injure navigability." KOONCE LECTURE, supra note 197, at 289 (emphasis added). 
But see United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 709 (1899). 
281. The Corps Regulations contain no limitation such as that proposd by the district court 
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gest that the Ninth Circuit's reading of the statute is the correct one. 
To date, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation has been adopted by the 
only other circuit court to address the issue explicitly.282 The Ninth 
Circuit's reading of section 10 is clearly an expansive interpretation 
of the Corps' subject matter jurisdiction. Under this reading, the 
Corps could theoretically assert jurisdiction over activities which 
alter or modify a navigable waterway, but which have no effect on 
the navigable capacity of the waterway. In fact, under either inter-
pretation of the statute, the Corps' subject matter jurisdiction under 
section 10 is quite broad.283 The standard set up by the district court 
is not one likely to limit drastically the jurisdiction of the Corps. 
Section 10, and more specifically the third clause of that section, 
has been interpreted broadly by the courts to restrict water diver-
sions and any other activity which alters the condition or capacity of 
a navigable waterway, whether such diversions are from the 
navigable water itself or from a nonnavigable tributary. In summary 
then, both the territorial and subject matter jurisdiction of the Act 
are quite broad; the Corps may require permits for a wide range of 
activities affecting a large portion of our nation's waters. In order to 
see what this means to the possible utility of the Act as a tool for a 
greater federal control over water allocations, it is necessary to ex-
amine the evolution and present extent of the Corps' review powers 
under section 10. 
D. The Public Interest Review of the Section 10 Permit Process 
Once a proposed structure or activity is found to be within the 
jurisdiction of the Corps under section 10, a permit must be obtained 
before that proposal can be lawfully carried out.284 The Corps' 
on the assertion of jurisdiction over activities within navigable waters. 33 C.F.R. § 322.3(a) 
(1981). However, as presently promulgated, the Corps regulations do limit assertion of 
jurisdiction over activities affecting navigable waters to those which affect the "navigable 
capacity of the waterbody." [d. at S 322.3(a)(l) (1981). The new regulations proposed at 45 
Fed. Reg. 62,732 (1980) contain no such limitation; activities outside the bound.aries of the 
navigable waterway will need only to affect the "physical capacity of the waterway." 
282. Norfolk & Western Co. v. United States, 641 F.2d 1201, 1210-11 (6th Cir. 1980). 
283. The requirement that an activity obstruct the navigable capacity is also a concept 
susceptible of broad interpretation. Navigable capacity means the capacity for navigation over 
any part of the waters in question when in their normal condition. Hubbard v. Fort, 188 F. 
987,996 (C.C.D. N.J. 1911). The district court in Cal. v. Sierra Club found the obstruction in 
the tendency of the facilities in question to lower water levels and to cause net flow reversals. 
The court said: "Although it is true that the exact magnitude of these effects was not precisely 
established, it is clear that they are far from any sort of de minimis exception eiltablished by 
Rio Grande." 400 F. Supp. at 632. 
284. See supra text and notes at notes 166-67. 
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regulations285 set out a complex procedure by which the Corps deter-
mines whether a permit should be issued or denied, and if it is 
granted, the terms of the permit.286 In its evaluation of a permit ap-
plication, the Corps has always considered the effect of the proposed 
activity on navigation and navigable capacity.287 In more recent 
years, the factors which the Corps can and must consider in review-
ing an application have expanded dramatically.288 To understand the 
impact of the permit requirement and the potential utility of the per-
mit process as a tool for federal regulation of western water alloca-
tions, the present scope of the Corps' review powers under section 
10 must be examined. 
For many years after passage of the RHA, permit applications 
were reviewed only to determine whether the structure or activity 
would actually impede navigation or obstruct navigable capacity.289 
This limited view stemmed from the early belief that section 10 only 
empowered the Secretary of War to grant or deny permits on the 
basis of effect on navigation;290 there is nothing in the legislative 
history to suggest that the framers had anything else in mind. 291 
This early approach has long since been abandoned. 
285. 33 C.F.R. §§ 320-29 (1981). See supra text and notes at notes 158-91. 
286. As one commentator has noted, the number of permit applications, over 20,000 in 1976 
under § 10 and § 404 of the Clean Water Act, coupled with the "imprecise" nature of the 
standards for evaluating permits, has meant that in many cases the permit review may prove 
more procedural than substantive. Power, supra note 159, at 526-45. 
287. See Wis. v. Ill., 270 U.S. 367 (1929). 
288. See infra text and notes at notes 300-22. 
289. See generally Power, supra note 159, at 526. Professor Power cites the old licensing 
criteria of the Corps' Baltimore District office; the Baltimore "test" employed four main 
criteria: 
1. The structure could not exceed one-third the width of the waterway; 
2. the applicant could not enter the deepest portion of the waterway; 
3. the applicant could not build within 15 feet of a dredged channel way; 
4. the applicant, in general, had to avoid causing any hazard to navigation. 
[d. Some districts did not even adopt such "formal" criteria at all. [d. Section 11 ofthe RHA, 
see supra note 149, further reduced the workload by authorizing the Corps to draw harbor 
lines within which work could be done without specific permission. Power, supra note 159, at 
527. 
290. See, e.g., Miami Beach Jockey Club, Inc. v. Dern, 86 F.2d 135, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1936); 
Port of Seattle v. Or. & Wash. R.R., 255 U.S. 56, 63 (1921). See also 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 284 
(1909). 
Until the mid-1960's, public notice announcing the filing of applications "defined the Corps' 
interest as being confined to issues of navigation, and requested comments from the public 
only on such issues." HOUSE COMM. ON GoV'T OPERATIONS, OUR WATERS AND WETLANDS: How 
THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS CAN HELP PREVENT THEIR DESTRUCTION AND POLLUTION, H.R. REP. 
No. 917, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 917]. 
291. See supra text and notes at notes 188-89. See generally Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d at 
207-14 (general discussion of authority to consider nonnavigation factors); Barker, supra note 
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Despite this history of limited review, the scope of review in the 
permit process has expanded dramatically in recent years. The first 
indication from the courts that more than navigation would be con-
sidered in evaluating a permit application came in 1933, in United 
States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern.292 In this case the Corps denied a 
permit for construction of a wharf. The wharf was not a hazard to 
navigation, but its construction would substantially increase nearby 
land values; land which was going to be condemned by the govern-
ment in order to build a road.293 The permit was denied on the basis 
that the construction of the wharf would needlessly cost the govern-
ment more money. 294 The Supreme Court upheld the denial of the 
permit, thereby opening the door for the Corps to consider non-
navigational factors in evaluating a permit. 295 
Over twenty-five years later, Congress took the first of several 
steps which proved important in the expansion of the Corps' review 
powers under the RHA. First! in 1958, Congress passed an amend-
ment to the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act.296 This Act provided 
that "wild life conservation shall receive equal consideration and be 
coordinated with other features of water-resource development."297 
Although Corps compliance with the spirit of this Act was slow at 
first,298 consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service of the 
Department of the Interior is now considered to be common practice 
when the Corps evaluates permit applications. 299 Second, and 
146, at 136-38. On the other hand, § 10 is not restricted by its specific terms to activities which 
actually affect navigation. See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d at 207-08. 
292. 289 U.S. 352 (1933). 
293. [d. 
294. [d. 
295. [d.; see also United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 423-27 
(1940). The Supreme Court in this case explicitly rejected the view that Congress may regulate 
navigable waters only for the purpose of navigation. This decision was not a RHA decision and, 
thus, did not squarely decide whether the Corps has the authority to deny a permit on the basis 
of nonnavigational factors. The sweeping declaration of power in this case, however, clearly 
opened the door for the Corps to use its authority under § 10 for purposes other than the pro-
tection of navigation. [d. See generally Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d at 207-14 (general discussion of 
authority to consider nonnavigation factors); Barker, supra note 159. 
296. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-664 (1976). 
297. [d. § 661(1). The Fifth Circuit inZabelv. Tabb, 430 F.2d at 209-10, found direct support 
in the legislative history of this Act for the interpretation that Congress intended the 
Corps to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service before issuing a permit for a private dredge 
and fill operation. 
298. Power, supra note 159, at 527. 
299. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(c) (1981); see supra text and note at note 175. In a 1\:)67 memoran-
dum of understanding, the Corps agreed to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Senices of the 
Department of the Interior before issuing permits. See Power, supra note 159, at 527. 
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perhaps more important, was the passage of the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEP A). 300 NEP A requires all 
federal agencies to make a detailed environmental impact statement 
(EIS) for all major federal actions significantly affecting the quality 
of the human environment.301 The Corps' regulations were amended 
in response to NEPA's requirements by providing for a two-step en-
vironmental review process.302 First, the District Engineer makes 
an "environmental assessment" of the likely impact of the proposed 
activity.303 Then, if the District Engineer believes that granting the 
permit may be warranted, but that the proposed activity would 
significantly affect the quality of the human environment, an EIS 
must be prepared.304 Both of these Acts thus required the Corps to 
consider nonnavigational factors in making permit decisions. 
In 1970 and again in 1972, Congress pressured the Corps to follow 
these statutory dictates strictly. The House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations urged the Corps to intensify its environmental 
review in order to protect wetlands and to require applicants to 
demonstrate that the proposed work was in the public interest.306 
The same Committee repeated itself in 1972, urging that the Corps 
"exercise its jurisdiction over navigable waters of the United States 
to the fullest extent available. "306 Thus, Congress made explicit the 
300. Jan. 1, 1970, P.L. 91-190, Title I, § 101, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
4331-4347) (1976). 
301. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976). While NEP A seems to leave the agency with discretion, the 
courts have interpreted its requirements as allowing a minimum amount of discretion. In the 
opinion of the district court in Cal. v. Sierra Club, if a project under the RHA has or will have 
significant impact on the environment, then issuance of a permit by the Corps is automatically 
a major federal action requiring an EIS. 400 F. Supp. 610, 644 (N.D. Cal. 1975). See also 
Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 161-62 (4th Cir. 1973) (Corps had to do more than make a cur-
sory review of generally favorable comments about the environmental impact of proposed con-
struction); see generally Power, supra note 159, at 530-34. 
302. 33 C.F.R. S 325.4(b)(1) (1981). See also supra text and note at note 169. 
303. 33 C.F.R. S 325.4(b)(1) (1981). If the assessment indicates no significant effect on the 
environment, the assessment may serve as the EIS. Id. § 325.4(b)(2). 
304. Id. S 325.4(b)(3). 
305. H.R. REP. No. 917, supra note 290, at 2-6. Prior to this prodding the Corps had, in 
1968, instituted its own "public interest review." See Comment, supra note 188, at 182-83; 
Power, supra note 159, at 527-28. The House Committee urged vigorous application of this 
review by advocating that the Corps "increase its consideration of the effects which the pro-
posed work will have, not only on navigation, but also on conservation of natural resources, 
fish and wildlife, air and water quality, esthetics, scenic view, historic sites, ecology, and other 
public interest aspects of the waterway." H.R. REP. No. 917, supra note 290, at 2 (emphasis 
added). 
306. HOUSE COMM. ON GoV'T OPERATIONS, INCREASING PROTECTION FOR OUR WATERS, 
WETLANDS, AND SHORELINES: THE CORPS OF ENG'RS, H.R. REP. No. 1323, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 
6 (1972) [hereinafter cited H.R. REP. No. 1323]. 
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desire implicitly expressed in the statutes that the Corps should 
review nonnavigation factors in its permitting process. 
Court decisions and active Corps enforcement have translated 
these congressional directives into action. First, the landmark deci-
sion by the Fifth Circuit in Zabel v. Tabb 307 confirmed the Corps' 
broad power308 to consider more than factors of navigation and im-
pact on navigation in determining whether or not to grant a section 
10 permit.309 Basing its decision primarily on the application of 
NEP A and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act to the RHA 
rather than the RHA itself,310 the court upheld the denial of a permit 
on environmental grounds alone. 311 Second, the Corps of Engineers, 
in response to Zabel and NEP A, published new regulations detailing 
the Corps policy in evaluating permit applications; these regulations 
reflected, at least theoretically, an aggressive commitment to use the 
RHA to serve ecological values.312 In some areas of the country, 
primarily in the Fifth Circuit, the theoretical commitment to 
ecological values has been translated into an active use by the Corps 
of its permit authority to protect the environment. 313 Thus, both the 
courts and the Corps have acted on the broad mandate to consider 
nonnavigational factors in their evaluation of whether or not to issue 
a permit. 
307. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). This decision prompted 
a great deal of academic commentary speculating on the ramifications of the RHA's use as a 
tool for environmental protection. See, e.g., Goldstein, Environmental Law-Consideration 
Must Be Given to Ecological Matters In Federal Agency Decisions-Zabel v. Tabb, 3 ENVT'L L. 
REV. 575 (1972). 
308. The court in Zabel stressed, however, that both NEPA and the Fish and Wildlife Act 
require consideration of nonnavigational factors in the permit process. 430 F.2d at 213. 
309. The activity at issue in this case was a permit application to fill in eleven acres of 
tidelands. There was evidence that the fill would do extensive ecological damage but no 
evidence of interference with navigation. Id. at 201. 
310. The court did find that the RHA does not restrict the basis for denial of a permit to 
navigation factors. Id. at 207. In addition, the court considered House Report No. 917, H.R. 
REP. No. 917, supra note 290 as evidence of how Congress construes the Corps' duty under 
the RHA. 
311. 430 F.2d at 214. The court said: "When the House Report and the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969 are considered together with the Fish and Wildlife Coordina-
tion Act and its interpretations, there is no doubt that the Secretary can refuse on conserva-
tion grounds to grant a permit under the Rivers and Harbors Act." Id. 
312. See Barker, supra note 146, at 141. See supra text and notes at notes 171-80 for a 
discussion of the public interest review currently in place in the Corps regulations. 
313. See supra cases cited at notes 270. See also United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp. 1132, 
1138-40 (S.D. Ga. 1973); United States v. Cannon, 363 F. Supp. 1045, 1049-50 (D. Del. 1973); 
United States v. Baker, 1 ENVT'L L. REP. 20,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Deltona Corp. v. Alexander, 
504 F. Supp. 1280, 1282-83 (M.D. Fla. 1981). See generally Barker, supra note 14{i, at 143-47 
(discussion of Corps' denial of a permit for a dredge and fill project which would have 
destroyed more than 2,000 acres of wetlands. Based on a complete administrative record 
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The RHA is potentially applicable to much of the western states' 
water allocation activities. Many of the waterways in the west come 
within the protective reach of the Act. Water diversions, which make 
up much of the western states' water allocation activity, are within 
the Corps' jurisdiction. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, the Corps 
may consider a wide range of factors to determine whether or not to 
issue a permit. The breadth of the Corps' review powers suggests 
that the permit process may be adaptable for use as a tool for a 
greater measure of federal control of western water allocations. 
However, the recent Supreme Court case of California v. Sierra 
Club left open the question whether the application of the RHA to 
western water allocations would be limited, or even barred. Before 
examining the degree to which the RHA can and should be used in 
the context of western water law, it is thus necessary to examine the 
issues left open by the decision in California v. Sierra Club. 
IV. CALIFORNIA V. SIERRA CLUB 
A. Factual Background 
Western water rights law and section 10 clashed in the litigation 
culminating before the Supreme Court in California v. Sierra 
Club. 314 The suit was initiated in 1971 when two environmental 
groups and two individuals315 brought an action to contest the con-
struction and operation of three facilities of the California Water 
Project (CWP).316 The primary cause of action317 alleged that the 
state and federal defendants318 failed to comply with the re-
quirements of sections 9 and 10 of the RHA in constructing and 
operating the Tracy and Delta pumping plants. 319 Further, it was 
which balanced all of the factors in its regulations, the Corps concluded that the permit was not 
in the public interest. Despite the Corps' action in this case, however, this commentator sees 
the Corps' performance as inconsistent). 
314. 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
315. The Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, Hank Stram (fisherman), and William Dixon 
Oandowner). Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 619 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
316. Id. The three facilities in question were the Delta Pumping Plant, the Tracy Pumping 
Plant, and the proposed Peripheral Canal. 
317. Six claims were made as part of the original complaint. I d. at 620. The primary claim 
was the one based on § 10 since it was the only one at issue before the Supreme Court. 
318. The federal defendants were the Secretary of the Interior, the Commissioner of the 
Bureau of Reclamation, the Secretary of the Army, and the Chief of Engineers. The state 
defendants were California's Secretary for Resources and the state's Director of the Depart-
ment of Water Resources. Id. 
319. The Tracy Plant had been operating at least partially for 20 years at the time of suit. 
The Delta Plant had been operating since 1967 and the addition of more pumps was planned as 
of the time of the suit. Id. at 620-21. 
158 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:111 
alleged that the proposed construction of the so-called Peripheral 
Canal would be unlawful without Corps' approval. 320 
All three facilities at issue in this case are part of the CWP. 321 The 
CWP is a mammoth water development project constructed to 
alleviate California's water problem; its basic goal is the redistribu-
tion of water from the water-abundant north and central parts of the 
state to the water-deficient areas in the central and southern por-
tions of the state.322 The CWP consists of both federal and state 
facilities. The Tracy Pumping Plant is part of the federal component 
of the CWP known as the Central Valley Project (CVP),323 while the 
Delta Pumping Plant is the core of the state component, the State 
Water Project (SWP).324 The Peripheral Canal, if built, would be 
financed, constructed, and operated by the state of California.325 
Water allocations from both the federal and state components of the 
CWP are subject to state water law. 326 
The function of both the Tracy Pumping Plant and the Delta 
Pumping Plant is the exportation of water from the Sacramento San 
Joaquin Delta (Delta) to the water deficient portions of the state.327 
The Delta consists of approximately 700 miles of waterways, only 
some of which are navigable.328 The Tracy Plant, which is located on 
a nonnavigable inlet channel of Old River in the Delta, diverts water 
from the Delta by pumping it into the 1I5-mile Delta Mendota 
canal. 329 The Delta Plant, located on the edge of the Delta about two 
miles from navigable waters, diverts water from the Delta by pump-
ing it into the California Aqueduct.33o Most of the water diverted 
320. To date, the Peripheral Canal has not been constructed. The project will be put before 
the voters of California in a June, 1982, statewidt:: referendum. Id. 
321. See Note, supra note 50 (discussion of history of the CWP). 
322. Sierra Club, 400 F. Supp. at 618. 
323. The CWP consists of dams, reservoirs, pumping plants, canals, and other facilities to 
supply water for irrigation and other uses in the Central Valley of California. To this end, ex-
cess water is stored behind dams in the Sacramento River and then released, as needed, to 
flow down river and into the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta (Delta). Id. at 618. 
324. The CWP was created by the Burns-Porter Act of 1959. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 
12930-12942 (West 1971), as the analogue to the CVP. It consists of dams, canals, pumping 
plants, and other facilities designed to generate power, CVP provide flood control, and 
transfer water from the Delta to the more arid regions of central, coastal, and southern 
California.ld. 
325. Id. at 621-22. 
326. See supra note 50. 
327. Sierra Club, 400 F. Supp. at 618-20 (description of the geography of the Delta). 
328. Id. at 619. 
329. Id. at 618. The canal takes the water to Central Valley, one ofthe more arid regions of 
California. 
330. Id. at 618-19. A majority of the water transported from Northern California to 
southern and central California travels through the Delta Pumping Plant and the California 
Aqueduct. Id. at 619. 
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from the Delta by the SWP is contracted for by water districts in the 
south and central portions of the state.331 The Peripheral Canal, as 
proposed, would be a 42-mile canal allowing California to divert high 
quality fresh water from the Sacramento River directly to the Tracy 
and Delta Plants. 332 
B. The District and Circuit Courts' Opinions 
The federal district court had three main issues to resolve regard-
ing the plaintiffs' claim that the operation and construction of the 
three facilities were in violation of the RHA. First, the court had to 
determine, as a procedural matter, whether the private plaintiffs had 
a right of action under the RHA.333 Second, it had to determine 
whether any of the three facilities came within the scope of either 
section 9 or 10 and thus required Corps authorization. 334 Finally, if 
authorization was required for any of the structures, the court had to 
determine whether such authorization had been obtained.335 The 
court held in the plaintiffs' favor on all three issues. 
First, the court found as a threshold matter that the plaintiffs had 
a right to sue under the RHA.336 After making this determination, 
the court examined the merits of the claim that the facilities were in 
violation of the RHA. Toward this end, the court evaluated each of 
the facilities to see if they came within the scope of section 9. The 
court determined that neither of the pumping plants were within the 
scope of section 9, but.the Peripheral Canal was found to be clearly 
prohibited by the section.337 The court then examined whether any of 
the structures came within the scope of section 10.338 In discussing 
the scope of section 10, the court addressed two threshold questions 
concerning its coverage. First, the court dismissed the defendant's 
argument that the pumping plants were not within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Corps because they were not actually over or in a 
navigable waterway.339 The court held that jurisdiction of the Corps 
331. Id. 
332. Id. at 621. 
333. Id. at 622-25. 
334. Id. at 626-32. 
335. Id. at 632-38. 
336. Id. at 622-25. 
337. Id. at 626-28. The court found that the canal as planned would constitute a "dike" 
within the meaning of § 9. The pumping plants, however, were not "over or in" any navigable 
water and thus did not constitute the kind of structure regulated by § 9. Id. 
338. Id. at 628-32. The court was unsure whether the necessity to obtain authorization 
under § 9 for the Peripheral Canal preempted the need for § 10 approval. It was the opinion of 
the court that no such preemption occurred. Id. at 628 n.21. 
339. Id. at 628. Both plants were over two miles from a navigable portion of the Delta. 
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under section 10 was not determined by physical location, but rather 
depended on operational effect.340 Second, the court rejected the 
contention that the Corps' subject matter jurisdiction extends only 
to those activities which actually affect navigation.341 The court 
found that the plain wording of the statute prohibits obstructions to 
navigable capacity and was thus at odds with the defendant's inter-
pretation.342 After rejecting both suggested limitations on Corps' 
jurisdiction, the court found that both pumping plants affected the 
navigable capacity of the navigable portions of the Delta343 and were 
therefore subject to the approval requirements of the third clause of 
section 10.344 
Finally, the court examined the record to see if any of the struc-
tures had received the proper authorization from the Corps under 
the third clause of section 10. This examination revealed that no 
authorization had been obtained.345 The court therefore found the 
plants to be in violation of section 10 and ordered that the proper 
authorization be obtained.346 
On an appeal by the federal and state defendants, the Ninth Circuit 
Court affirmed the lower court's decision in part and reversed it in 
part.347 The circuit court upheld the district court's finding that the 
plaintiffs had a right of action under the RHA 348 and found that 
the plaintiffs had proper standing for their suit.349 The appellate 
340. Id. The Court said: 
The test of whether a Section 10 permit is required for a particular project is not 
wholly dependent upon the location of specific structures but looks also to the opera-
tional effect of the project .... If the functional effect of these structures (i.e., water 
diversions) is to obstruct navigable capacity in the Delta, then Section 10 approval 
will be required. 
Id. at 628-29. 
341. Id. at 629-30. 
342. Id. See supra note 150 for text of § 10. The section prohibits obstructions to navigable 
capacity, not navigation. 
343. The court found two effects on the navigable waters of the Delta caused by the opera-
tion of the pumping plants: "(1) It tended to lower the water levels in the Delta; and 
(2) it caused net flow reversals. A net flow reversal occurs when the net flow for a given tidal 
cycle is in a different direction than the normal direction." Id. at 630. 
However, by finding it necessary to establish that the operation of the pumping plants con-
stituted an obstruction to navigable capacity for the activity to be within the scope of the 
Corps' subject matter jurisdiction, the district court would be in disagreement with the Circuit 
Court. See supra text and notes at notes 276-83. 
344. Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 632 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
345. Id. at 632-38. 
346. Id. at 651. 
347. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1979). 
348. Id. at 587-92. 
349. Id. at 592-93. 
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court did not address the section 9 issue,350 but did agree that the 
two pumping plants came within the scope of third clause of section 
10,351 for different reasons than those cited by the district court on 
that point.352 The court found, however, that congressional 
authorization existed for the Tracy Plant and, thus, overturned the 
district court's finding that that plant was in violation of section 
10.353 
In upholding the district court's finding that the state's pumping 
plant was in violation of section 10, the circuit court rejected an 
argument made by the state of California that the RHA should have 
only limited applicability to water diversions made pursuant to state 
water law. 354 The state argued that the congressional policy of 
deference to state regulation of water required that application of 
section 10 be limited to those cases where there is a demonstration of 
substantial tangible interference with navigable capacity by the 
water diversion.355 The Ninth Circuit Court found no support for 
such a limitation. 356 
C. Argument Before the Supreme Court and The 
Supreme Court Opinion 
In its petition for certiorarP57 and in its briefs before the Supreme 
Court,358 the state of California focused its attention on one issue.359 
The state urged that, notwithstanding how the RHA applied in 
350. [d. at 585. The district court's ruling as to the Peripheral Canal was not challenged on 
appeal. 
351. [d. at 593-600. 
352. [d. at 594-97. See supra text and notes at notes 276-83. 
353. [d. at 600-05. 
354. [d. at 597-600. See infra text and notes at notes 359-417 for a more detailed discussion 
of the related argument the state made before the Supreme Court. 
355. Sierra Club, 610 F.2d at 597-600. 
356. [d. The court said: "The congressional policy of compliance with state law for the ap-
propriation, purchase, condemnation, and distribution of water rights, in the absence of ex-
press congressional provision to the contrary, cannot be lifted from the context of reclamation 
so as to encroach upon the express provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Act." [d. at 598. "The 
federal authority set forth in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 reigns paramount. Congres-
sional deference to traditional state regulation of water rights, a consideration of significance 
in other contexts, does not operate to restrict the express policy of section 10." [d. at 600. 
357. State of California's Petition for writ of certiorari, Cal. v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 
(1981) [hereinafter cited as State Petition]. 
358. Brief for Petitioner, State of California, Cal. v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) 
[hereinafter cited as State Brief]; Reply Brief of Petitioner, State of California, Cal. v. Sierra 
Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) [hereinafter cited as State Reply Brief]. 
359. The state briefed other arguments in addition to the federalism argument. Chief 
among these was one on statutory construction which disputed the Ninth Circuit's expansive 
reading of the scope of the third clause. State Brief at 52-58. See supra text and notes at notes 
276-83. 
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general, the Supreme Court should fashion a common law rule either 
exempting state-authorized water allocation projects from the re-
quirements of the Act altogether,360 or, in the alternative, limit the 
application of the statute to situations where actual navigation was 
placed in jeopardy. 361 The state argued that application of the RHA 
to state-authorized water diversions would conflict with the estab-
lished congressional policy of deference to state water law.362 In sup-
port of its position, the state cited the early federal statutes which 
recognized the state's power to make its own water law~:63 and the 
many statutes and court decisions which subsequently recognized 
state authority to control the appropriation, use, and distribution of 
water.364 The basis of the state's argument was the principle of 
federalism, allegedly affirmed by these congressional and judicial ac-
tions. 
Furthermore, the state argued that this established federal policy 
indicates that the RHA was not intended to apply to projects 
authorized by state water law.366 Instead, the preferable construc-
tion of Section 10 would be to exempt state-authorized water alloca-
tions from the coverage of the Act and, thus, to follow the congres-
sionally chosen policy of deference.366 In the alternative, the state 
argued that, if the RHA does apply to state-authorized water alloca-
tions, the potential conflict between the Act and the congressional 
policy of deference requires that the Act receive a limiting construc-
California also made an ill-considered argument that the RHA was not meant to cover state 
activities at all. State Brief at 48-50. This position was seemingly dropped in the state's Reply 
Brief. It is clear that states are under the restrictions of the RHA. See, e.g., United States v. 
Ariz., 295 U.S. 174, 184 (1935); N.J. v. N.Y., 283 U.S. 336, 344-45, 348 (1931). 
California did not address the private right of action issue. The federal respondent argued 
against finding a private right of action and supported granting of cert. for this reason alone. 
Brief for Federal Respondents, Cal. v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 
Federal Respondents Brief]. 
360. State Brief at 37-39. In this part of the alternative argument the state was not arguing 
that the states were not subject to the federal navigation power but "only" that the RHA 
should not apply. They argued that the federal navigation interests in this age were neutral, 
i.e., not at stake, and that when and if navigability was threatened the federal government had 
the power to rectify it independent of the 1899 Act. State Brief at 41-43. 
361. State Brief at 39-43; State Reply Brief at 6-8. 
362. State Brief at 36-37. 
363. State Brief at 14-17. See supra statutes discussed at notes 55-64. 
364. State Brief at 14-19. See supra statutes and cases discussed at notes 65-78, 107-15. 
365. State Brief at 36-41. 
366. Id. at 37-39. The essence of the state's argument in this regard is that, in the light of 
expressed deference to state water law prior to passage of the 1890 and 18~19 Acts, the 
absence of expressed intent in the Act or legislative history to regulate state water diversions 
means that such regulation was not intended. 
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tion, one which would accommodate both the need to protect 
navigability and allow the states to retain control of their waters.367 
The state maintained that the only way this could be done would be 
to limit the assertion of Corps' jurisdiction over water allocations to 
cases where the navigability of a waterway was truly in jeopardy. 368 
Such a balancing or harmonizing accommodated conflicting policies, 
was clearly within the Court's power,369 and was not inconsistent 
with the RHA.370 Finally, the state argued that either alternative 
would be more consistent with the traditional roles of the states and 
the Corps than the decision reached by the lower courtS.371 The 
state's argument was twofold: first, the RHA should not apply to 
state-authorized water allocations because of federalism concerns; 
and second, even if federalism was not an issue, Congress never in-
tended the RHA to apply to state-authorized water allocations. 
The Supreme Court in California v. Sierra Club reversed and 
vacated the decision by the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case to 
the district court.372 The Court held simply that there was no implied 
private right of action under section 10 of the RHA.373 In so holding, 
the Supreme Court explicitly did not reach the underlying merits of 
the case before it: the extent to which state water allocations are sub-
ject to the permit requirements of section 10.374 The following sec-
tion seeks to resolve the issue left open by the Supreme Court. 
367. State Brief at 39-43. 
368. [d. 
369. [d. at 36-37, 40-42; State Reply Brief at 4-5. The state cites cases and rules of statutory 
construction that hold that when there is a potential conflict between statutes they should be 
interpreted, if possible, in a way that harmonizes and accommodates their purpose and mean-
ing. See, e.g., Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 208-09 (1955); 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CON· 
STRUCTION § 53.01 (C. Sands ed. 1973). 
More specifically, California argues that where the statutes conflict, the court has the 
power to make a common law rule to the extent necessary to achieve Congress' broad goals in 
the fields of reclamation, water allocation, and navigation. See, e.g., Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 
406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972). See infra text and notes at notes 378-415 for a discussion of 
whether there is a conflict. 
370. State Brief at 41-43. 
371. [d. at 44-48. 
372. Cal. v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
373. [d. See supra text and notes at notes 16-25. 
374. Cal. v. Sierra Club at 1781. The court said: 
[d. 
Petitioner the State of California urges that we reach the merits of this case-
whether permits are required for the state water allocation projects-regardless of 
our disposition of the private cause of action issue. This we decline to do .... [W]e 
cannot consider the merits of a claim which Congress has not authorized respondents 
to raise. 
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D. The Unanswered Question: Should the RHA Apply to 
Water Diversions Authorized by Western State Water Law? 
An analysis of the merits of the state's arguments for an exception 
to the general application of the RHA is best done in three steps. 
First, the question of the application of federalism principles to this 
situation must be addressed. Second, an analysis must be done of the 
merits of the state's preferred argument that Congress did not in-
tend the RHA to apply to state water allocations. Third, assuming 
that its preferred interpretation is without merit, the state's last 
argument must be examined. Namely, should the application of the 
section 10 permit requirements to state water allocations be limited 
to situations where actual navigation interests are at stake'? 
1. Does Federalism Prevent the Application of the RHA 
to State Water Allocations? 
The state's argument that state-authorized water allocations 
should be exempted from the permit requirements of the RHA in 
order to be consistent with principles of federalism is contradicted by 
several Supreme Court decisions which suggest that the navigation 
power, as exercised under the RHA, overrides state concerns.375 For 
example, in Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States,376 section 
10 was applied to a state-authorized diversion of water from Lake 
Michigan. The Supreme Court, in this case, explicitly held that the 
power of section 10 was superior to the state's power to provide for 
the welfare of its citizens. The Court said: "This is not a controversy 
between equals .... [T]he main ground [of the action] is the authori-
ty of the United States to remove obstructions to interstate and 
foreign commerce. There is no question that this power is superior to 
that of the states to provide for the welfare or necessities of their in-
habitants."377 Thus, there is little judicial support for the argument 
that principles of federalism should limit the federal navigation 
power as that power has been exercised in the RHA. The state's 
other argument, that the statute's application in this context should 
be either limited or barred, remains to be discussed. 
375. See, e.g., Wis. v. Ill., 278 U.S. 367 (1929); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. 
Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899); see also United States v. Ariz., 295 U.S. 174, 184 (1935). 
376. 266 U.S. 424 (1925). 
377. Id. at 425·26. See also Rio Grande, 174 U.S. at 709 (the Supreme Court used a state 
water diversion to illustrate the extent of jurisdiction under § 10 of the 1980 Act); see infra 
text and notes at notes 396·98. 
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2. Did Congress Intend for the RHA to Reach State 
Water Allocations? 
165 
The consistent congressional policy of deference to western state 
water law cannot be ignored.378 The statutes cited by the state in its 
briefs before the Court clearly evidence the intent of Congress to 
allow the western states to govern the appropriation and allocation 
of their surplus waters.379 This history of deference does not, 
however, necessarily support an argument that the RHA should not 
apply in the context of state water allocation projects. 
Neither the RHA, nor its legislative history, expressly addresses 
the issue of whether Congress intended the RHA to cover water 
diversions authorized by state water law. 380 The great weight of 
authority suggests, however, that Congress intended the RHA to ap-
ply to state-authorized water allocation projects in the same manner 
the Act would apply to any other activity coming within its restric-
tions. First, the legislative history of the RHA indicates that no such 
general exception to the coverage of the Act was intended. Second, 
the deference to state water law expressed in other federal statutes 
does not warrant an implication that the RHA should not apply to 
such water diversions. Third, a special construction of the statute 
would be contrary both to the established policy of reading the RHA 
broadly and to the clear weight of precedent. Each of these elements 
must be considered at greater length. 
a. Legislative History 
The legislative history of the RHA does not expressly indicate that 
state water diversions are included under the Act. 381 However, the 
history of the Act suggests in several ways that an exemption of all 
state water diversions was not contemplated by this omission. First, 
the RHA was, at least in part, a response to a series of Supreme 
Court decisions which held that a specific congressional statute was 
needed to abate or prevent obstructions to navigable waterways.382 
378. See supra text and notes at notes 62-78. 
379. Id. 
380. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976). See supra note 150 for text of Act, see supra text and notes at 
notes 188-89 for discussion of the Act's legislative history. 
381. California argued that in the light of the established federal policy of deference, the 
absence of express inclusion means that state water projects were not intended to be covered 
by the Act. See supra text and notes at notes 365-70. 
382. See supra notes 146-48. 
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No nonstatutory means of protecting navigability has arisen since 
these decisions. Thus, the primary motivation for the initial passage 
of the Act undermines the state's contention that the federal in-
terests in navigation can be protected by some means other than the 
RHA. 
Moreover, the obstructions that abounded prior to passage of the 
original RHA were largely authorized by state laws or state fran-
chises.383 The intent of Congress to assert the paramount federal 
authority over navigation and thus to override all forms of state-
authorized interference was expressed during debate on the 1890 
Act on the floor of Congress.384 Despite this legislative history, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the poorly drafted 1890 Act as not pro-
hibiting state-authorized obstructions.385 This interpretation of the 
1890 Act led to one of the changes made for the 1899 Act. In that 
legislation, Congress explicitly limited the states' ability to authorize 
obstructions.386 This change underlines the intent of Congress to 
protect the navigability of its waterways from all forms of in-
terference. Thus, the legislative history of the RHA, while not 
specifically stating that water allocations were to be included, sug-
gests that a broad exclusion of all state water diversions from the 
provisions of the Act was not intended by its framers. 
b. Other Federal Statutes 
The deference to state water law expressed in other federal 
statutes does not warrant an implication that the RHA should not 
apply to state-authorized water diversions. The petitioners in 
California v. Sierra Club argued that the broad congressional 
delegation of authority to the western states to make their own 
water law indicates that any intent to limit this authority with the 
383. See supra cases cited at note 148. See generally Power, supra note 159, at 506. 
384. See 21 CONGo REC. 8605 (1890). Indeed, the structure of the 1899 Act suggests that 
when Congress intended state authorization to be enough they stated so outright. Section 9 
contains the limits on state ability to authorize obstructions. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). See supra 
note 149. 
385. United States V. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U.S. 211, 215 (1900). Section 10 of the 
1890 Act stated that the prohibited obstructions must be "affirmatively authorized by law." 
The Supreme Court interpreted this ambiguous language to mean that either state or federal 
authorization would be sufficient. [d. at 215. 
386. The language "affirmatively authorized by law" in the 1890 Act was changed to read 
"affirmatively authorized by Congress" in the 1899 Act. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976). See generally 
Comment, supra note at 188. See also KOONCE LECTURE, supra note 147, at 287,289 (Judge 
Koonce, one of the principal draftsmen of the 1899 Act supports this reading of the legislative 
history). 
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RHA would have to be clearly expressed.387 However, a careful ex-
amination of the statutes in which this deference appears, and of the 
court opinions interpreting these statutes, indicates that the federal 
power to protect navigable waters, exercised by the enactment of 
the RHA, is not limited by the policy of deference.388 It is important 
to examine in greater detail how the federal policy of deference 
relates to the federal power to protect navigation. 
The Mining Act of 1866389 and the Desert Land Act of 1877390 
were the early federal statutes recognizing the western states' right 
to make their own water law. 391 Neither statute, however, suggests 
that the federal government intended to limit its ability to protect 
navigable waters in any way.392 In fact, Supreme Court decisions in-
terpreting these statutes have held that they do not restrict the 
federal government's power over navigable waters.393 For example, 
in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 394 the defend-
ant argued that these early acts conferred upon the states the 
unrestricted right to appropriate waters of a navigable stream.395 
The Supreme Court, while affirming the broad control of the states 
over their waters, rejected the idea that the federal government had 
given up control over navigable waters in this legislation.396 Further, 
the Court held that even if these early statutes could be construed as 
having limited the ability of the federal government to protect 
387. State Brief at 37-39. 
388. This position is well supported by an early, leading authority on western water law and 
advocate of local control over western waters. 1 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS 578, 
588-97, 1155 (2d ed. 1912). 
389. Ch. 262, 14 Stat. 253 (1866). See supra note 60. 
390. Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877). See supra note 6l. 
391. See supra text and notes at notes 55-64. See also Cal. v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 
656-58 (1978); Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935). 
392. By its terms, the Desert Land Act was limited, giving state control over only surplus 
nonnavigable waters. See supra notes 61-63. 
393. See, e.g., Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 159 (1935). 
In this case the Court explicitly recognized the strong power of the states to control their 
water but found one limitation on that power to be "that of the general government to secure 
the uninterrupted navigability of all navigable streams." See also Kan. v. Colo., 206 U.S. 46, 
86 (1907) (recognizing same exception to states power); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & 
Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899). Accord Cal. v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 662 (1978). See 
supra note 64. 
394. 174 U.S. 690 (1899). 
395. [d. at 702-08. 
396. The Court said: 
Obviously by these acts [the Desert and Mining Acts], so far as they extended, Con-
gress recognized and assented to the appropriation of water in contravention of the 
common law rule as to the continuous flow. To infer therefrom that Congress in-
tended to release its control over the navigable streams of the country and to grant 
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navigability at the time they were enacted, the later passage of the 
1980 Rivers and Harbors Act would be controlling;397 the RHA was, 
in the Court's opinion, clearly intended to limit the state's ability to 
interfere with the navigability of a stream. 398 
Similarly, the statutes enacted after the passage of the RHA in 
1899399 do not indicate that Congress, in expressing its policy of 
deference to state management of its water resources, in any way 
limited the coverage of RHA.400 In its argument, the state relied 
heavily on the statement of congressional policy in section 8 of the 
Reclamation Act of 1902401 which, as discussed above,402 recently 
received an expansive interpretation by the Supreme Court in 
California v. United States. 403 However, not only is there no express 
statement in that statute limiting the scope of the RHA, but the ex-
pression of policy in section 8 is limited by its terms to a restriction of 
federal interference with state law arising out of the operation of the 
Reclamation Act itself.404 In addition, the Supreme Court in United 
... the right to appropriate the waters or the sources of navigable streams to such an 
extent as to destroy their navigability, is to carry those statutes beyond what their 
fair import permits. 
[d. at 706. 
397. The Court said: 
But whatever may be said as to the true intent and scope of these various statutes, we 
have before us the legislation of 1890 .... As this is a later declaration of Congress, 
so far as it modifies any privileges or rights conferred by prior statutes it must be 
held controlling, at least as to any rights attempted to be created since its passage; 
[d. at 70. 
398. The Court said: 
Whatever may be said in reference to obstructions existing at the time of the passage 
of the act, under the authority of state statutes, it is obvious that Congress meant 
that thereafter no State should interfere with the navigability of a stream without the 
condition of national assent. 
[d. at 708. 
399. See supra text and notes at notes 65-78. 
400. Were the statutes enacted after passage of the 1899 Act to be construed as the state 
urged, they would necessarily operate as implicit partial repeals of that statute. Repeals by im-
plication are not favored. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-90 (1978); Morton 
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549-51 (1974). 
In addition, when Congress has desired to remove Corps jurisdiction over activities falling 
within the scope of § 10, it has done so directly. See, e.g., § 154 of the Water Resources 
Development Act of 1976, 33 U.S.C. 591 (1976) (§ 10 prohibitions of wharves and piers shall 
not apply to any intrastate water which is only "navigable" on basis of historical use); see also 
Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. Alexander, 613 F.2d 1054, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
401. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976). See supra note 71 for the text of this provision. 
402. See supra text and notes at notes 73-78. 
403. 438 U.S. 645 (1978). 
404. Section 8 states: "Nothing in this Act [is intended to interfere with state law] relating 
to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation." § 8, 32 Stat. 390 
(emphasis added). 
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States v. California, while enunciating a broad statement on the 
federal policy of deference to state water law, explicitly recognized 
that state power over its streams was limited by the federal power to 
protect navigability.405 
3. Should the Corps' Jurisdiction Over State Water 
Diversions Be Limited? 
In its briefs before the Supreme Court, California argued that, if 
the RHA was applicable to state-authorized water diversions, its 
restrictions should be limited in application to those diversions which 
substantially impair actual navigation.406 The state argued that such 
a common law rule of construction was necessary to avoid conflict 
with the congressional policy of deference and that it was more con-
sistent with the purpose of the RHA.407 The basis for this argument 
is thus the same as that used in the state's intent of Congress argu-
ment. 
The state's argument that a common law rule should be made 
limiting the jurisdiction of the Corps depends on the existence of a 
conflict between the literal application of the RHA and the congres-
sional policy of deference.408 This argument seems bound to fail for 
two reasons. First, the congressional policy of deference to state 
water law does not conflict with application of the restrictions of sec-
tion 10.409 As discussed at length above, the deference accorded by 
Congress to state management of western water resources is 
distinct from Congress' power to protect navigation.410 Thus, requir-
ing a permit for water allocation activities within the scope of the 
Corps' jurisdiction will not conflict with the congressional policy of 
deference to state control of its water resources. Moreover, it is clear 
that the congressional policy of deference can be accommodated by 
adding the state's interests in allocating water to the balancing proc-
ess which attends review of permit applications.411 Therefore, a 
405. 438 U.S. at 662. The court explicitly acknowledged the existence of two exceptions to 
state control of waters which were carved out by the Supreme Court in Rio Grande, 174 U.S. 
at 703. See supra note 64 for the two exceptions carved out by the Court in Rio Grande. 
406. State Brief at 39-44; State Reply Brief at 6-8. 
407. [d. See supra text and notes at notes 362-74. 
408. As support for the adoption of a common law rule, the state cited the rule of statutory 
construction that, where literal application of a statute would lead to absurd results or conflict 
with other statutes, the two conflicting policies or statutes should be harmonized. See Cox v. 
Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 208-09 (1955); 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 53.01 (C. 
Sand ed. 1973). See also supra note 369. 
409. Absent such a conflict between the assertion of jurisdiction by the Corps and the con-
gressional policy of deference there need be no harmonizing. [d. 
410. See supra text and notes at notes 389-405. 
411. See supra text and notes at notes 165-76 for discussion of the review process. See infra 
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special rule of construction limiting the application of the RHA is not 
needed to avoid conflict with the congressional policy of deference. 
Second, assuming arguendo that the normal operation of the RHA 
does conflict with the congressional policy of deference, limitation of 
the Corps' jurisdiction in the manner suggested by the state would 
be inconsistent with the form and purpose of the RHA. The state 
argued that, in order to avoid the conflict, the Corps' ability to assert 
jurisdiction over state water allocation activities should be limited to 
those "obstructions that substantially affect the 'capacity' of the 
waters to support actual navigation in the area where commerce ac-
tually takes place. "412 This limitation of the Corps' ability to assert 
jurisdiction conflicts with the form of the statute. The RHA is a per-
mit statute; the Corps is supposed to determine whether an activity 
coming within the scope of its jurisdiction is a reasonable or unrea-
sonable obstruction to navigable capacity.413 To limit the Corps' 
assertion of jurisdiction over an activity normally within its scope by 
requiring a preliminary finding of a particular degree of interference 
confuses the criteria for assertion of jurisdiction with those for deny-
ing a permit.414 Moreover, a limitation on the ability of the Corps to 
assert jurisdiction over activities normally within its purview will 
conflict with the statute's purpose of effectively protecting the 
navigable capacity of this nation's waterways.415 A limitation of the 
Corps' jurisdiction to activities which significantly affect navigable 
capacity ignores the problem of the cumulative effects of water 
allocations. The cumulative effects of individual water diversions, 
which would not by themselves come under the Corps' review under 
the limiting construction proposed by the state, may cause signifi-
cant damage to the navigable capacity of a waterway. In the normal 
course of events, the Corps must consider the cumulative effect in 
determining whether to issue a permit to an activity within its 
text and notes at notes 435, 442-45 for discussion of how the federal policy of deference and 
the states interests will be considered in the review process. 
412. State Reply Brief at 6. 
413. Wis. v. Ill., 278 U.S. 367, 413 (1929). The Court said: 
Id. 
The true intent of the Act of Congress was that unreasonable obstructions to naviga-
tion and navigable capacity were to be prohibited, and in the cases described in the 
second and third clauses of Section 10, the Secretary of War, acting on the recom-
mendation of the Chief of Engineers, was authorized to determine what in the par-
ticular cases constituted an unreasonable obstruction. 
414. Id. See also United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 486-87 (1980); 
Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 429 (1925); KOONCE LECTURE, supra 
note 147. 
415. See supra text and note at note 190. 
1982] RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT 171 
jurisdiction.416 Finally, a requirement that a water project or diver-
sion, otherwise within the scope of section 10, be found to have a par-
ticular degree of effect on a waterway before the Corps may assert 
jurisdiction conflicts with the purpose of the statute by the sheer in-
efficiency of regulation such redundancy would promote.417 Thus, a 
limitation of the ability of the Corps to assert jurisdiction over ac-
tivities already within its jurisdiction would conflict with the purpose 
of the RHA to protect navigable waters. 
In summary, the primary legal question left open by the Supreme 
Court decision in California v. Sierra Club seems unlikely to be 
resolved by imposing a limitation of the RHA's applicability to state-
authorized water allocations. Rather, the Corps should be able to re-
quire permits for any water allocation activity coming within the 
broad scope of its authority under section 10. The degree to which 
section 10 can, should, and is likely to be used by the federal govern-
ment to assert a greater measure of control over the allocation of 
western waters will be the focus of the final section of this article. 
V. Is THE RHA A VIABLE TOOL FOR A GREATER MEASURE OF 
FEDERAL CONTROL OVER WESTERN WATER ALLOCATIONS? 
A. Can the RHA be Used to Affect a Greater Degree of 
Federal Control Over Western Waters? 
The potential utility.of section 10 as a tool for greater federal con-
trol over water allocations lies in the breadth of its jurisdiction418 and 
in the broad public interest review of its permit process.419 Given the 
broad interpretation of the Act's territorial and subject matter 
jurisdiction, it seems clear that much of the prospective water alloca-
tion activity in the western states could be subjected to the permit re-
quirements of section 10.420 The permit process provides the means 
416. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(2)(IV) (1981). See supra text and note at note 172. 
417. Such determinations of effect on a navigable waterway are generally reserved for the 
permit process itself. A court rule of interpretation which would limit the RHA in this way 
would thus go against the general court policy of reading this statute broadly to effectuate its 
purpose. See supra note 190. 
418. See supra text and notes at notes 191·283. 
419. See supra text and notes at notes 284·313. 
420. The Corps probably would not assert jurisdiction over many of the water allocations 
already authorized by state law. First, the Corps may be estopped in many cases from pros· 
ecuting failure to apply for a permit for past water allocations as such enforcement of the act 
would be a radical departure from past practice. United States v. Penn. Indus. Chemical Corp., 
411 U.S. 655, 670·75 (1973) (the Supreme Court ruled that in a criminal prosecution under § 13 
of the Rivers and Harbors Act for the discharge of refuse, the trial court erred in excluding 
evidence that the defendant was affirmatively mislead by the Corps' past administrative prac· 
172 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:111 
by which the federal government can take a greater measure of con-
trol over western water allocations.421 The actual amount of federal 
control over water allocation depends on the extent to which western 
water allocations would be within the Corps' jurisdiction and the ex-
tent to which the permit process could be used by the federal govern-
ment to regulate water allocations. 
The territorial jurisdiction of the Corps under the RHA is quite 
broad. Except for the possible limitation that the waterways be 
"navigable waters of the United States,"422 the current definition of 
navigability at law brings many of the waterways in the west under 
the direct protective jurisdiction of the COrpS.428 In addition, the 
Corps can indirectly assert jurisdiction over land or nonnavigable 
waters if activities or structures in those areas affect a navigable 
waterway in a prohibited fashion.424 Thus, the Corps' territorial 
jurisdiction is potentially broad enough to encompass a major portion 
of the west's waterways. 
Furthermore, a large portion of the water allocation activities in 
the west potentially fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
Corps and are subject to the permit requirements.425 As discussed 
above,426 much of the west's water supply is diverted from surface 
streams and then allocated to various uses according to state law. 427 
Section 10 has been interpreted broadly to cover water diversions 
both from navigable portions of a waterway and from nonnavigable 
tributaries if the diversion affects the navigable portions.428 All 
tice). But see, e.g., Weiszmann v. Dist. Eng'r, 526 F.2d 1302, 1305-06 (5th Cir. 1976) (the Fifth 
Circuit rejected such a defense to Corps' prosecution for failure to acquire a permit). 
It seems more likely that a decision to regulate state waters allocation activities more active-
ly would be gradually phased in via "grandfather clauses." See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 328.5(b) 
(1981). These regulations stipulate that a permit will not be required for work commenced or 
completed before a certain date within established harbor lines. Work within these harbor 
lines had traditionally been exempt from permit requirement, but new regulations required 
permits for such activities. Hence the "grandfather clause" to excuse those persons who relied 
on old regulations. 
421. See supra text and notes at notes 284-313. 
422. See supra text and notes at notes 221-31. 
423. See supra text and notes at notes 218-19. 
424. See supra text and notes at notes 239-47. 
425. See supra text and notes at notes 267-83. 
426. See supra text and notes at notes 26-28. 
427. See, e.g., Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925). 
428. See, e.g., United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 708-09 (1899); 
Cal. v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). 
However, the degree of effect on the navigable waters caused by the diversion which is 
necessary to trigger Corps' jurisdiction has recently been the cause of dispute. See supra text 
and notes at notes 276-83. The better supported view is that if the diversion, whether from a 
navigable water or from a nonnavigable tributary, alters or modifies the condition or capacity 
of the navigable water then it is automatically within Corps' subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 
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water diversions and like activities which alter or modify the condi-
tion or capacity of navigable waters are within the jurisdiction of the 
Corps.429 A lowering of the level of a waterway is an alteration or 
modification under section 10.430 This effect almost automatically 
follows from a diversion of water from a waterway or one of its sup-
plying tributaries.431 Thus, the Corps potentially may require per-
mits for much of the water diversion activity of the western 
states.432 
Once state water allocations projects are considered within the 
jurisdiction of the Act, the federal government will be able to affect a 
greater measure of control over state water allocations through the 
permit process itself. The primary mechanism through which this 
control would be exercised is the broad public interest review. 433 In 
the public interest review the Corps must consider and balance all 
factors relevant to the particular permit request.434 In this broad 
review of a permit application the Corps must consider not only the 
state's interests in allocating its water435 and the effect of the diver-
sion on navigable capacity, but must also consider a broad range of 
other factors.436 The Corps is required by law to consider the 
environmental effects and to consult with other federal agencies;437 
further, the Corps' review power is expansive enough for it to con-
sider any conflicting federal or interstate need for the water in-
volved in the proposed diversion, as well as the growing need for 
conservation of water resources.438 In short, the permit process can 
function as a federal overview of state water law. 
429. See supra cases cited at notes 427-28. 
430. See Sanitary Dist., 266 U.S. at 423-26; Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. at 632. 
431. [d. 
432. The state of California in its briefs before the Supreme Court indicated its belief that 
the statute, read broadly, would apply to much of the state's water allocation activities. State 
Brief at 13. 
433. See supra text and notes at notes 166-80, 284-313. 
434. See supra text and notes at notes 172-76, 296-313. 
435. See 33 C.F.R. S 320.40) (1981). It is at this point that the federal policy of deference and 
the concerns which underlie it will have to receive consideration, rather than before the Corps 
asserts jurisdiction. Given the strong policy of deference to state control recognized by the 
Supreme court in the recent cases of Cal. v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) (discussed 
supra text and notes at notes 72-78) and United States v. N.M., 438 U.S. 696 (1978)(discussed 
supra text and notes at notes 107-15), it seems clear that the state's interests in allocating 
water as it sees fit will have to be given great weight. See infra text and notes at notes 442-43. 
436. 33 C.F .R. S 320.4 (1981). See supra text and notes at notes 172-76, 296-313. 
437. [d. 
438. In regard to the consideration of competing federal needs for water, the Supreme 
Court has upheld denial of a S 10 permit for analogous reasons. In United States ex reI. 
Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352 (1933), the Court upheld denial of a permit for nonnaviga-
tional concerns specifically because the construction of the wharf would increase land values of 
land soon to be condemned by the federal government. See supra text and notes at notes 
292-95. 
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Not only can the federal government thus make sure that its in-
terests in water and matters of environmental protection and con-
servation are considered, it can also see that they are protected. If 
the Corps determines that the balance of interests weighs against 
the issuance of a permit, it can deny the application or issue the per-
mit with conditions imposed to protect the public interests.439 Thus, 
the Corps has veto power over state-authorized water allocations 
should they conflict with other interests.44o Perhaps more important-
ly, the Corps could use its open-ended power of review to eondition 
permits so as to protect federal interests, protect the environment, 
and to promote water conservation.441 Of course, the Corps' deci-
sions are fully reviewable.442 It seems likely that, given the congres-
sional policy of deference to state water law, the Corps' decisions to 
deny or condition permits would receive close judicial scrutiny. 443 
Still, the RHA is theoretically adaptable for use by the federal 
government to achieve a greater measure of control over western 
water allocations. It is not clear, however, that the federal govern-
ment will use the RHA in this manner. 
B. Is the RHA Likely To Be Actively Used in the Context 
of Western Water Allocations in the Near Future.? 
In the recent past, section 10 has been the focus of attempts to use 
the RHA for more active federal protection of nonnavigable in-
In the context of a review of an application for a water allocation permit the Corps would 
thus be able to consider the possibility of competing demands for the water in question. 
439. See supra text and notes at notes 176-80, 307-11. 
440. See, e.g., Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971) 
(Corps' permit denied for nonnavigational concerns). See supra text and notes at notes 307-11. 
441. 33 C.F.R. §§ 325.2(aX6), 325.5(aX2), 325.8(b) (1981). 
Aside from the reviewability of any Corps' action to determine reasonableness of an action 
there is no apparent limit on the Corps' power to condition permits to protect the public in-
terest. See supra text and notes at notes 176-80. 
442. See supra text and note at note 180. 
443. The Supreme Court in Cal. v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) and United States v. 
N.M., 438 U.S. 696 (1978), has indicated that it takes the congressional deference to state 
water law seriously; thus, it seems likely that a denial or conditioning of a permit will receive 
close scrutiny. 
The decision in New Mexico may indidate the degree of scrutiny to which Corps' actions in 
this context may be subject. As discussed above, see supra text and notes at notes 107-55, the 
statute under which the federal government was claiming an implied reserved right to water 
was subjected to a very strict and literal interpretation by the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court's method in that case might also apply in the context of the review of a Corps' permit 
denial. Insofar as the permit is denied or conditioned to protect navigation, the Corps is likely 
to be upheld as this was the purpose of the RHA as originally enacted. Similarly, insofar as a 
permit is denied for environmental reasons, the Corps would appear to be on solid ground as 
the impetus for this aspect of the public interest review comes from clearly identifiable con-
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terests.444 Because it is a permit statute with broad jurisdiction, the 
RHA is a prime candidate for use beyond its original purpose. The 
impetus for the activist use of the statute has come from both within 
and without the federal government, primarily in the context of envi-
ronmental protection. 
In 1970, the House Committee on Government Operations urged 
the Corps to expand its permit process to consider more actively the 
environmental effects of projects within its jurisdiction.446 Specifi-
cally, it suggested that the Corps be especially solicitous of the ef-
fects of projects on wetlands and other ecologically delicate areas.446 
At the same time, the Committee urged that the Corps reevaluate its 
laissez-faire attitude towards drawing harbor lines447 and more 
vigorously enforce the Refuse Act.448 Two years later, the same com-
mittee urged the Corps to use its jurisdiction to its fullest extent to 
protect the environment.449 Thus, there is precedent for an expan-
sive use of the RHA by the federal government. 
Through the 1970's, an expansive interpretation of the RHA was 
the theoretical basis of private parties and public interest groups for 
many environmental suits. The willingness of many courts to imply a 
private right of enforcement under the Act460 prompted increasing 
use of the RHA by environmental groups to force consideration of 
gressional policies and statutes. However, if a permit is denied for other reasons, such as pro-
tection of federal needs for water, it seems likely that, on the basis of New Mexico, such a deci-
sion would be carefully scrutinized and, thus, may not survive. 
444. See infra text and notes at notes 448-51. See also supra text and notes at notes 314-54. 
Cal. v. Sierra Club is an example of such use. 
445. H.R. REP. No. 917, supra note 290. 
446. [d. at 6. 
447. [d. at 6. See supra note 199. See generally Power, supra note 159, at 509-10 for a 
discussion of harbor lines. 
448. H.R. REP. No. 917, supra note 290, at 14-18. The Committee suggested that the 
Refuse Act, § 13 of the RHA, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976) constituted a potentially powerful weapon 
for combating pollution in navigable waters. Section 13, like § 10, received broad interpreta-
tions over the years. See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960). The next 
two years saw the attempted use of the so-called Refuse Act to prevent water pollution. Presi-
dent Nixon established a formal § 13 permit program on Dec. 23, 1970. See Comment, supra 
note 188, at 170. Problems arose with these attempts and the permit process under § 13 ended 
with passage of the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 
S 1342 (1976). For a criticism of the use of the Refuse Act in this manner, see Comment, 
Discharging New Wine into Old Wineskins: The Metamorphosis o/the Rivers and Harbors Act 
0/1899,33 U. PITI. L. REV. 483, 485 (1972). 
449. H.R. REP. No. 1323, supra note 315, at 16-26. Some Corps' districts have proven more 
committed to the protection of the environment than others. See Barker, supra note 146, at 
142. 
450. E.g., Potomac River Ass'n, Inc. v. Lundberg, Maryland Seamanship School, Inc., 402 
F. Supp. 344, 357 (D. Md. 1975), see also Lavagino v. Porto-Mix Concrete, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 
323,325-26 (D. Colo. 1971). Cf Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. Dep't of Transp., 423 F.2d 
104, 106 (3d Cir. 1970). 
176 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:111 
the environmental impact of various activities arguably within 
Corps' jurisdiction.461 Despite the broad use of the RHA in the re-
cent past and the present motivation for such expansive application 
in the context of water allocations, however, it seems unlikely that 
the RHA will be actively applied in this context in the near future. 
The primary reason for this conclusion lies in the recent decision 
by the Supreme Court in California v. Sierra Club not to allow 
private enforcement of the Act.462 This decision effectively precludes 
the possibility that expansive application of the RHA will come from 
the private sector. Without private enforcement of the Act, it seems 
unlikely that the purview of the Act will be enlarged in the near 
future. At this time, the federal government is in a period of re-
trenchment; the Reagan administration is cutting back on federal 
regulation in the area of environmental protection463 and is in the 
process of handing power back to the states.464 In this atmosphere, 
the Corps is not likely to actively regulate state water allocations ab-
sent a significant threat to navigation interests.466 
Despite the present political atmosphere, the RHA still provides 
the federal government with the potential power to take a more ac-
tive role in western water allocations without passing new legisla-
tion. As long as conflicts exist over the use and control of western 
waters and the need exists to reform water policies, the RHA could 
be used actively by the federal government. The wisdom of using this 
statute to foster greater federal involvement in water law is ques-
tionable. The final section of this article will address the problems in-
herent in such a use of the RHA. 
451. See, e.g., James River and Kanawha Canal Parks, Inc. v. Richmond Metropolitan 
Auth., 359 F. Supp. 611, 639 (E.D. Va.), afJ'd, 481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973); Alameda Cons. 
Ass'n v. Cal., 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.), em. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971), as interpreted by 
Sierra Club v. Leslie Salt Co., 354 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
452. See supra text and notes at notes 23-25, 372-73. 
453. See generally Peters, What's Watt in Surface Mining Regulation-The Unsteady 
Balance of State and Federal Authority Under SMCRA, 10 B.C. ENVT'L. AFF. L. REV. __ 
(1982) (a discussion of the recent cutbacks in federal regulation of strip mining). See also 47 
Fed. Reg. 1,689-1,739 (1982). The President's Task Force on Regulatory Relief has prompted 
a great many proposed changes to government regulations. One agency threatened by the pro-
posed regulation reform is the Corps' permit program. [d. at 1,697-98 
454. President's State of the Union Address, 18 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 76 (Jan. 26, 
1982). 
455. See supra note 453. The Corps' permit program is unlikely to escape the present 
"reforms" unscathed. 
1982] RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT 
C. Should the RHA Be Used by the Federal Government 
to More Actively Oversee Western Water Allocations? 
177 
While active use of the RHA by the federal government to gain a 
greater measure of control over western water allocations seems 
both plausible and supportable in law, it is not clear that the Act 
should be used in this manner. There are serious questions whether 
the oversight available through the RHA would just create another 
layer of confusing, redundant regulation exacerbating the federal-
state conflict over control of water while alleviating few of the iden-
tified problems.456 The factors militating against such use of the 
RHA arise out of the inherent limitations of using a statute for pur-
poses for which it was not intended, and from weaknesses in the per-
mit process. 
Difficulties arise from using a statute to achieve ends for which it 
was not intended. If it is assumed that the answer to present con-
flicts over western waters is a centralization of power in the federal 
government,457 the RHA has major limitations. First, the RHA is 
only indirectly applicable to water allocations. Unlike a statute ex-
pressly enacted to regulate water diversions,458 the section 10 per-
mit process requires a demonstrated effect on a navigable water 
before the Corps may assert jurisdiction and regulate water diver-
sions. This indirect nature of the federal control seems likely to limit 
the usefulness of the statute. In addition, and perhaps more impor-
tant, the indirect nature of the control seems likely to result in 
inconsistent enforcement.459 The enforcement mechanism of the 
Corps depends to a large degree on complaints of other public agen-
cies and public interest groupS.460 Thus, enforcement of the Act is 
generally inconsistent, depending more on the degree of public op-
456. See supra notes and text at notes 79-143; see also Harrison & Woodruff, supra note 
420 at 1978-80 (suggesting that, in addition to causing delay and inconvenience, regulation 
may interfere with property rights). 
457. It is not in fact clear that a shift of power to the Federal government in this area is 
desirable. 
458. See Hanks, supra note 14, at 35 (a hypothetical posed of what new legislation to 
regulate this area would be like, the major difference being that a new statute would be applied 
directly to regulate water allocations and would probably go to the full scope of the federal 
navigation power). 
459. See supra text and notes at notes 312-13. 
460. See 47 Fed. Reg. 1,697-98 (1982). Dependence on outside pressure for enforcement is 
one of the problems with the Corps regulating program identified by the Presidential Task 
Force on regulatory relief. See also Power, supra note 159, at 554-55. 
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position than the degree of public interest involved. States are 
unlikely to apply voluntarily for the Corps' permits for water alloca-
tions only arguably within the ambit of the Act.461 Therefore, the ap-
plication of the Act in this context is likely to depend a great deal on 
the enforcement mechanism of the Act, resulting in inconsistent ap-
plication of the section 10 restrictions. 
In addition, there is a problem, perhaps not insurmountable, with 
the use of the Corps as the agency asserting federal control over 
state water allocations. The Corps' traditional area of expertise is in 
protection of navigation and development, not in weighing the com-
peting needs and uses for water resources.462 Thus, the Corps may 
not be qualified to make these determinations, at least not initially. 
Finally, insofar as the motivation for increased federal control of 
western waters is reform of the problems of western water law, 463 
the RHA seems likely to fall short. Despite the breadth of its poten-
tial coverage, it will not cover all water allocation activities;464 nor 
does it seem adaptable to consideration or rectification of all of the 
problems in western water.465 Thus, the likely result of these limita-
tions is exacerbation of the confusion already attendant to the 
federal-state division of power over western waters,466 with limited 
benefits. 
Despite these limitations inhering in the RHA as a general federal 
regulatory tool over western waters, the Act still seems adaptable 
for use by the federal government to achieve at least some of its 
potential goals. Weaknesses in the permit process as it works in 
461. See, e.g., Cal. v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287,101 S.Ct. 1775 (1981). 
462. However, to varying degrees, the Corps has adapted itself to its expanded permit proc-
ess and public interest review. One commentator considers the greatest strength of the permit 
process to be the Corps' role as a mediator, balancing the conflicting views of the public and 
other agencies with its own fundings on the effect of navigation. Power, supra note 159, at 
547-56. 
Were the federal government to adopt a clearer policy toward water allocations the Corps 
could probably adapt to a greater role in western water allocations. 
463. See supra text and notes at notes 79-143. 
464. For example, in the opinions of several recent court decisions, the RHA is limited in ap-
plication to "navigable waters of the United States," see supra text and notes at notes 221-31. 
Under the modern interpretation of the extent of the federal navigation power, a new federal 
regulatory statute would have no such limitation. Despite the evolution of many aspects of the 
RHA, the Act is likely to be limited by its place in history. See supra note 230. 
465. Most notably, it is not clear that the broadest interpretation of the RHA would allow 
Corps' intervention into the area of ground water mining. Ground water mining-withdrawals 
from aquifers made at rates greater than net recharge-is a growing problem in the western 
states. The problems stemming from such mining were a major focus of President Carter's 
Water Policy Review. See supra note 140. 
466. See supra text and notes at notes 76-143. 
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practice suggest, however, that the greater measure of federal con-
trol available through active use of the RHA may not serve any 
useful purpose.467 The weaknesses of the permit process can be il-
lustrated by examining the degree of environmental protection 
afforded by the Act. 
The shortcomings of many of the western states' laws in adequate-
ly considering the environmental effects of water allocations have 
been discussed.468 The Corps' permit process, which requires compli-
ance with NEP A and consultation with other federal agencies, would 
theoretically alleviate this state weakness by providing a broader, 
more uniform review of the environmental impact of a particular 
project.469 It is not clear, however, whether the Corps' review of the 
environmental effects of water allocation projects would result in 
substantially better protection of the environment. First, despite the 
existence of federal environmental standards, the federal govern-
ment has been as culpable as the states in putting environmental 
values second to economic concerns in the context of water develop-
ment.470 Second, the Corps' commitment to environmental protec-
tion has been inconsistent, notwithstanding NEPA and the ex-
panded decision criteria.471 The inconsistent application of environ-
mental protection is attributable to the decentralized character of 
the Corps' permit process which has led the different districts to 
take a variety of positions on the weight to be given to environmen-
tal factors.472 One commentator has suggested that the degree of en-
vironmental commitment shown by a particular district office is 
closely related to the interest of the residents of the area.473 
Therefore, insofar as a greater degree of federal involvement in 
western water allocation may be desirable for purposes of en-
467. Some of the problems with the permit process outlined below would be alleviated if the 
federal government adopted clearer standards and a clear policy toward the relative interests 
in the context of water allocations. 
468. See supra text and notes at notes 42-45, 129-34. 
469. See supra text and notes at notes 169-75, 296-306. Independent federal review of the 
environmental effects would theoretically have the added virtue of being less influenced by the 
traditional state emphasis on economic development. 
470. See Policy Study, supra note 11 at 36,788-90. See generally Aiken, supra note 11. 
471. See generally Barker, supra note 146, at 142-48. This commentator cited interviews 
with unidentified Corps officials of one district who admitted that EIS's were prepared only 
for projects which generated public opposition. Such a practice is clearly unacceptable under 
NEPA. [d. at 147. 
472. [d. See generally Liroff, Administrative, Judicial and Natural Systems: Agency 
Response to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 3 Loy. U. CHIC. L.J. 19, 29-30 
(1972); Hoyer, supra note 158, at 29-35; Power, supra note 159, at 526-36, 547-56. 
473. Barker, supra note 146, at 147; see Power, supra note 159, at 554-55. 
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vironmental protection, it is not clear that application of the RHA 
would result in more environmentally sensitive decisions. 
The problems underlying the Corps' environmental review process 
carryover to the permit process as a whole and suggest that an ex-
pansive application of the RHA to state water allocations would, to a 
large extent, be redundant474 and, at worst, promote confusion and 
inconsistency. The open-ended decentralized nature of the permit 
process allows consideration of a broad range of criteria and pro-
motes flexibility in the decision process; but it also has some negative 
implications. First, there is little guidance in the regulations for 
deciding what factors are relevant to proposed activities, or on how 
to weigh the relevant factors.475 The resulting uncertainty promotes 
narrow, ad hoc decision making,476 inconsistent results amongst the 
various districts, and an inordinate degree of influence by public in-
terest groups and other public agencies.477 In summary, a broad ap-
plication of the RHA to state water allocations, without changes in 
the permit process,478 would not necessarily serve any useful pur-
pose. The likely result would be merely to add another layer of some-
times redundant regulation with inconsistent results. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The scarcity of water in the western United States has made the 
use and control of the available water supplies matters of great con-
cern to the western states. In response to the scarcity of water, a 
unique system of water rights developed in the western states. Most 
474. See supra note 50 (general description of how one state's permit process operates). But 
see 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(j)(7) (1981) (district engineer can enter into an agreement with the states 
to process Army and state permits jointly, thereby cutting down on redundancies). 
475. See 33 C.F.R. § 32Q.4 (1981). 
476. See Power, supra note 159, at 551-56. "This fragmentation of decision making creates 
both the possibility of overlooking cumulative effects and the tendency to ignore some of the 
higher order questions. Id. at 552. 
477. Id. at 551-66. Professor Power suggests that the major problem with the permit proc-
ess is that the procedures are better designed to veto projects than to expedite them. 
The procedures are well designed to allow the Corps to pick out and arrest projects 
that public agencies or significant private interest groups consider contrary to the 
public interest; but the procedures are not well designed to approve projects that, on 
balance, are in the public interest, but involve significant social costs and engender 
substantial opposition. 
Id. at 554. 
478. However, within the very real limitations of using the statute in a broader way at all, if 
the Corps adopted an express, detailed policy for dealing with water allocations in the permit 
process, a degree of federal oversight for environmental protection and water eonservation 
purposes could prove valuable in the short run. 
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of the western states have also enacted comprehensive statutory 
schemes to administer the use and allocation of water in accordance 
with state defined goals. The federal government acquiesced in the 
development of western water laws and has, in many Congressional 
enactments directly and indirectly dealing with western waters, in-
dicated that it would defer to the states' control of the use and 
distribution of their waters. 
In more recent years, however, the federal and state governments 
have clashed over the use and control of western waters. The main 
source of the conflict has been the increase in federal need for water. 
The federal government has shown an increasing reluctance to sub-
mit to state water law to satisfy its needs and has employed several 
means to acquire rights to water independent of state law. In addi-
tion, a potentially more potent source of conflict lies in the need for a 
national water policy and for reforms of state water law. Recent 
years have seen several aborted federal initiatives for better protec-
tion of the environment and greater consideration of the need for 
conservation of water in water resource development. These con-
flicts and potential conflicts have left the division of power over 
western waters uncertain; the sources of the conflict raise the possi-
bility that the federal government may in the future seek to take a 
more active role in the allocation of western waters. 
While the federal government seems to have the power to take a 
more active role, it seems unlikely to exercise it in the form of new 
legislation in the near future. However, a recent case raised the 
possibility that an existing federal statute, section 10 of the Rivers 
and Harbors Act, could be employed by the federal government to 
achieve much the same purpose. 
The Rivers and Harbors Act is the primary federal statute for the 
protection of navigable waters. Section 10 of the Act is a permit 
statute. Certain activities or structures in, or affecting, navigable 
waters are prohibited unless they have the prior approval of the 
Corps of Engineers. Section 10 is a broadly worded, but ambiguous 
statute. Courts, however, have consistently interpreted the coverage 
of the Act expansively. While the Act has no particular application to 
state water allocations on its face, court interpretations of the ter-
ritorial and subject matter jurisdiction of the Act suggest that much 
of the west's water allocation activities are within the scope of its 
restrictions. Once a water project is subject to the restrictions, the 
federal government can assert a greater measure of control through 
the Corps' permit process. Although the statute was initially enacted 
to protect navigation, the Corps' power to review a project prior to 
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issuance of a permit has evolved far beyond consideration of only the 
effect that a proposed project has on navigation. Thus, section 10 of 
the RHA, given the breadth of its coverage and of its permit process, 
seems adaptable for use by the federal government to assert a more 
active role in western water allocations. California v. Sierra Club, 
however, a case involving application of section 10 to state water 
allocations, left open the question of the extent to which the RHA ap-
plied to state water allocations. In that case, the Supreme Court did 
not reach the State of California's argument that federalism con-
cerns, namely the long history of Congressional deference to the 
state control of its waters, required either a complete exemption of 
state water allocations from the coverage of the Act or a limitation 
on the normal extent of the Corps' jurisdiction. An analysis of the 
state's argument, however, indicates that it should not prevail. 
Nevertheless, while the statute can thus be used by the federal 
government to achieve a greater measure of control over western 
waters, and indeed the statute has been used to achieve nonnaviga-
tional goals in the past, it does not seem likely that it will be used ac-
tively in this context in the near future. As this article is written, the 
federal government is scaling down its regulatory efforts and is 
handing power back to the states. In addition, the Supreme Court 
has refused to imply a private right of enforcement under the Act; 
impetus for active use thus cannot come directly from the private 
sector. 
Even if the government does sometime in the future attempt to ac-
tively employ the statute in this context, there are serious ques-
tions remaining as to the wisdom of such use. If a greater measure of 
federal control in the area of western water allocations is desirable, 
the RHA would not be the best vehicle for federal regulation. The 
RHA would add a layer of regulation while only partially addressing 
the problems raised by state allocation of water and may only exacer-
bate the present confused division of power over western waters. It 
is, furthermore, not clear that centralization of federal control over 
western waters in the federal government is even desirable. Some 
western states have begun to reform their laws and the preferred 
federal role may be in the form of providing incentive and direction 
to more state reform rather than asserting a greater measure of con-
trol. 
